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Framing Art Vandalism 
A PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS VIOLENCE AGAINST ART 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, an artist spray-painted the Picasso masterwork 
Guérnica with foot-high letters spelling “Kill Lies All.”1 Repeatedly 
since 1977, a German man has splashed sulfuric acid on museum 
masterpieces causing damage in excess of 130 million Euros to fifty-six 
paintings.2 In London in 1987, a man entered the National Gallery of Art 
with a sawed-off shotgun and fired at the museum’s prized Leonardo da 
Vinci drawing.3 In 1993, at a New York City museum, a guard inked 
love messages on a Pop Art painting he was hired to protect.4 In 1996, an 
art student gorged on blue-colored foods, entered New York’s Museum 
of Modern Art, and then vomited, in blue, on an important abstract 
painting.5 In 1999, a devout Catholic diverted a guard, a stanchion, and 
protective plexiglass to smear white paint he had smuggled into the 
museum over an unconventional portrait of the Virgin Mary.6   
These acts, diverse in motive, location, and technique, represent 
violence against works of art. Uniting them is the aim to attack not only 
  
 
1
 Michael T. Kaufman, “Guernica” Survives a Spray-Paint Attack by Vandal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1974, at 1. At that time, the painting was exhibited at New York’s Museum of 
Modern Art. Id. The vandal, Tony Shafrazi, “went on to become a rich and powerful art dealer.” 
Michael Kimmelman, A Symbol of Freedom and a Target for Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, 
at B7. 
 
2
 Bettina Mittelacher, Wiederholungstäter: Mit Anschlägen auf Meisterwerke hat Hans-
Joachim Bohlmann Millionenschaden verursacht (Repeat Offender: Hans Joachim Bohlmann’s 
Attacks on Masterpieces Have Caused Millions in Damage), HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT, June 28, 
2006, at S13; Man Splashes Acid on Three Duerer Works, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 22, 1988; 
Vandalism Suspect Confesses, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1977, at A31. 
 
3
 Mental Tests Suspect in Marring of Leonardo, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1987, at C17. 
Protective glass prevented the bullet, which was shot at close-range, from piercing the work, but 
glass splinters cratered a small portion of the drawing. Steve Boggan, The Invisible Mending, INDEP. 
(London), Nov. 17, 1991, at 3. 
 
4
 Robert W. Duffy, For Art’s Sake; Museum Doesn’t See Suit Over Vandalism as a 
War, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 9, 1996, at 4C; Carol Vogel, Inside Art, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
1993, at C23. The ink from guard’s messages, “Reggie + Crystal 1/26/91” and “I love you Tushee, 
Love, Buns,” saturated the canvas of Roy Lichtenstein’s painting, and the work reportedly “is now 
worth substantially less than it was before.” Museum Sues the Whitney Over a Disfigured Painting, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at C16; see also Vogel, supra. 
 
5
 See Anthony DePalma, No Stomach for Art, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, § 4, at 2. Six 
months prior to defacing the Piet Mondrian painting in New York, the student vomited in red on a 
Raoul Dufy painting at a museum in Ontario, Canada. See id.; Peter Small, Student Vomited on 
Paintings But Won’t Be Punished, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 12, 1996, at A12.  
 
6
 Roberto Santiago et al., Virgin Mary Canvas Defaced in B’klyn, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
Dec. 17, 1999, at 7. 
582 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2 
 
physical objects, but also the public’s sensibilities.7 Art vandalism indeed 
is more than a property crime:8 it is a violent act that targets objects the 
public holds dear.9 The German “acid-splasher” stated as much when he 
confessed that he “must destroy what other men cherish.”10 Even more, 
art vandalism can be seen as an attack on the fundamental social 
values—civility and egalitarianism among them—that enable and 
encourage the public’s encounters with art objects.11 Harm here to the 
  
 
7
 See, e.g., Christopher Cordess & Maja Turcan, Art Vandalism, 33 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 95, 96-98 (1993) (finding that many representatives from public art institutions 
experienced “a sense of hurt and outrage as a result of acts of vandalism against ‘their’ works of art, 
as if they felt they or a family member had been personally victimized”); Boggan, supra note 3 
(reporting that the public responded with “disbelief and great anger” to the shooting of the National 
Gallery’s Leonardo da Vinci drawing and saw the attacker as “a vandal who had tried to deprive the 
world of an irreplaceable object of beauty”); Jeffrey Kastner, Art Attack, ARTNEWS, Oct. 1997, at 
154, 156 ( “There’s a certain point beyond which an individual work of art becomes a possession of 
the entire culture . . . . These are attacks against the culture, and I take it personally. “ (quoting a Los 
Angeles Times art critic’s response to artists’ vandalism of others’ artworks) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Brad Kava, Mourning the Shards of Art; Art Lovers Salute the Remains of 
Vandalized Exhibit, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 2, 1995, at 1B (“As an artist, I feel like crying 
really hard . . . . It’s like being raped.” (quoting a visitor to an art exhibition after it had been 
vandalized) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 
8
 See, e.g., M. Kirby Talley, Jr., Dutch Disaster, ARTNEWS, Summer 1989, at 60, 61 
[hereinafter Talley, Dutch Disaster] (citing a museum director’s comments about the limited legal 
penalties under Dutch law for even serious instances of art vandalism). Dutch law “does not 
differentiate between damaging a work of art and vandalizing a lamp post.” Id. at 61. “‘Under the 
present situation it would seem there is no respect for works of art. . . . A more severe punishment 
has to come. Art must be given a separate status under the law.’”). Id. (quoting museum director Jup 
de Groot). Other European officials also have recently called for more stringent laws to control 
attacks on works of art. See, e.g., Charles Bremner, Vandals Leave a Poor Impression on Monet as 
Gallery Doors Fail, TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 2007, at 39 (reporting that the French Minister of 
Culture “called on the [French] Justice Ministry to consider a new law with strong penalties for 
damaging artworks and national treasures”); Trevi Fountain: Rutelli, Intolerable Vandalism, AGI 
(Italian News Agency), Oct. 19, 2007, http://www.agi.it/italy/news/200710191942-pol-ren0100-
art.html (reporting on the Italian Minister for Cultural Heritage and Activities’ call for passage of a 
more stringent law against “[art] vandalism, art theft and damage to the countryside” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)) (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).  
 
9
 See JOHN E. CONKLIN, ART CRIME 244-48, 250-53 (1994); DARIO GAMBONI, THE 
DESTRUCTION OF ART: ICONOCLASM AND VANDALISM SINCE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 17-20 
(1997); Gary Alan Fine & Deborah Shatin, Crimes Against Art: Social Meanings and Symbolic 
Attacks, 3 EMPIRICAL STUD. ARTS 135, 136 (1985); Gary Schwartz, The Destruction of Art: 
Iconoclasm and Vandalism since the French Revolution, ART IN AM., July 1998, at 29, 29 (book 
review); Alan G. Artner, For Iconoclasts, Art Vandalism is an Expression; Their Motivation Runs 
the Gamut, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2007, at C15 (“to attack an art work is the ultimate infringement as 
the art is unresisting and on view because of tacitly agreed upon benefits not just to one individual 
but the many”); Bremner, supra note 8 (“This is a mindless . . . attack on our memory, our heritage 
.” (quoting the French Minister of Culture’s response to an attack on a Monet painting in Paris’s 
Musée D’Orsay) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kaufman, supra note 1 (reporting that the New 
York City mayor “was ‘shocked and saddened by the brutal defacement,’ which he called ‘an 
outrageous act of violence,’” and that the lack of lasting damage to Picasso’s painting, which was 
displayed at New York’s Museum of Modern Art, is “‘a great relief to all New Yorkers and visitors 
. . . who come . . . to view [the] priceless masterpiece’”).  
 
10
 Vandalism Suspect Confesses, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1977, at A31 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also DAVID FREEDBERG, ICONOCLASTS AND THEIR MOTIVES 35-36 (1985). But 
see GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 198 (reporting that a German scholar surmised that this statement 
was not originally the attacker’s own, but rather adopted by the attacker from a criminologist’s 
comments on the attacks, which were published before the vandal’s arrest).  
 
11
 See Michael Kimmelman, A Symbol of Freedom and a Target for Terrorists, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, at B7 (“Proximity is the cost, and virtue, of a civil and democratic 
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public interest, however, evades criminal law, which inadequately 
distinguishes slashing a masterpiece from breaking a window.12 This 
Note argues that no adequate recognition exists for the harm caused by 
vandalistic attacks on objects which, unlike other tangible property, are 
valued both for their uniqueness and for their public significance.  
The lack of legal recognition for the public value in art has not 
gone unnoticed. Since the 1970s, legal commentators have cited 
instances of damage to art by its owners as reason to establish legal 
recognition and protection of the public interest in art.13 The public 
benefits from the preservation of and access to artworks, and these 
commentators have argued that art owners’ dominion over their property 
should accordingly be regulated to protect these public interests. To 
enforce preservation of and accessibility to works of art, they have 
proposed statutory and incentive-based schemes.14  
  
society. . . . Part of what’s beautiful about an art museum, aside from what’s on view, is that it 
implies trust—it lets us stand next to objects that supposedly represent civilization at its best and, in 
so doing, flatters us for respecting our common welfare.”); see also Fine & Shatin, supra note 9, at 
136 (“[T]he state or guardian is being attacked through the art work. An attack on an art object may 
be an attack on the community because of the perceived connection between the art object and the 
cultural heritage of the community.”). Museums, by definition, must make their collections 
accessible to the public. See infra note 27. This requirement applies to both collecting and non-
collecting institutions. Id.  
 
12
 Unauthorized damage or destruction to property is generally chargeable as criminal or 
malicious mischief, which protects against the financial loss vandalism causes property owners. See 
infra Part III.A. European countries criminalize art vandalism under statutes that are comparable to 
U.S. criminal mischief statues. See, e.g., Criminal Damage Act 1971, ch. 48 § 1 (Eng.) (“(1) A 
person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending 
to destroy or damage any such property . . . shall be guilty of an offence.”); Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] 
[Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl. 1] 450-2, as amended, § 303 , ¶ 1, translated 
in THE GERMAN PENAL CODE 175 (Stephen Thaman trans., 2002) (“(1) Whoever unlawfully 
damages or destroys a thing belonging to another shall be punished with imprisonment for not more 
than two years or a fine.”); Wetboek van Strafrecht [Sr] [Criminal Code] Mar. 10, 1984, Staatsblad 
van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 27, as amended, § 350, translated in THE DUTCH PENAL 
CODE 222 (Louise Rayar & Stafford Wadsworth trans., 1997) (“1. A person who intentionally and 
unlawfully destroys, damages, renders unusable or causes to disappear any property belonging in 
whole or in part to another is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than two years or a fine of 
the fourth category.”). Calls for stricter enforcement of art vandalism are frequently made. See supra 
note 8; see also Carolyn Kleiner, Mayhem in the Garden, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 31, 1999, 
at 69 (“Ton Cremers a Dutch museum-security expert, says the attacks have more to do with the 
justice system than with security. ‘In our country there’s hardly any difference between smashing a 
shop window and damaging an important piece of art.’” (quoting Ton Cremers)).  
 
13
 See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999); Albert Elsen, Why Do We Care About Art?, 27 
HASTINGS L.J. 951 (1976); John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 
CALIF. L. REV. 339 (1989); Note, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J. 121 (1981); 
Carl F. Stover, A Public Interest in Art— Its Recognition and Stewardship, 14 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 5 
(1984); Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property: Toward a 
National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177 (2001). 
 
14
 See, e.g., SAX, supra note 13, at 66-68 (proposing both voluntary tax deductions and a 
duty-based scheme to secure public access to significant works of art privately owned and not 
exhibited in public institutions); Christopher J. Robinson, The “Recognized Stature” Standard in the 
Visual Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1971-75 (2000) (proposing establishment of a 
“national registry of highly significant art”); Wilkes, supra note 13, at 204-09 (proposing tax 
incentives for art owners who preserve and provide public access to their collections and a “national 
register of cultural property” that designates culturally significant artworks). 
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Violence to art by non-owners—essentially, art vandalism—
generally has been addressed by non-legal scholars.15 While these 
scholars have alluded to the need to protect the public interest in art,16 
their main interest lies in defining art vandalism and the motives that 
underlie it17 and, in part, arguing for stricter criminal enforcement against 
art vandals.18  
Existing criminal law does not distinguish art vandalism from 
vandalism and typically classifies the deliberate destruction of artwork as 
criminal mischief.19 Criminal mischief laws enforce property rights by 
  
 
15
 Cordess & Turcan, supra note 7, at 95 (“Those [perspectives] particularly relevant to 
art vandalism include historical, criminological, sociological, and psychological accounts.” (citations 
omitted)). The studies referenced in this Note are from the following disciplines: art history, see 
generally, FREEDBERG, supra note 10; GAMBONI, supra note 9, criminology, see generally, Cordess 
& Turcan, supra note 7; Carine de Lichtervelde, Du Vandalisme ou de la Destruction et la 
Dégradation des Biens Culturels (Vandalism or the Destruction and Damage to Cultural Property) 
(2007) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium) (on file with 
university), available at http://www.museum-security.org/vandalisme%20biens%20culturels.htm, 
sociology, see generally CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 244-48, 250-53; Stanley Cohen, Campaigning 
Against Vandalism, in VANDALISM 215 (Colin Ward, ed., 1973) [hereinafter Cohen, Campaigning 
Against Vandalism]; Stanley Cohen, Property Destruction: Motives and Meanings, in VANDALISM, 
supra, at 23 [hereinafter Cohen, Property Destruction]; Fine & Shatin, supra note 9, at 135, 
psychology, see generally ARNOLD P. GOLDSTEIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VANDALISM (1996).  
  To the author’s knowledge, art vandalism, as defined in this Note, has not been 
previously addressed in a legal journal. The major art law treatises and case books do not discuss 
vandalism. See, e.g., JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT & ARCHITECTURE LAW (2007); RALPH 
E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW (2d ed. 1992); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, 
ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS xxvii (5th ed. 2007) (referring to the threat from “[d]eranged attacks 
on Michelangelo’s Pieta and Rembrandt’s Night Watch” but providing no further discussion of art 
vandalism). 
 
16
 FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 35-36. 
 
17
 See id.; GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 9-12. 
 
18
 Cordess & Turcan, supra note 7, at 96-98; Fine & Shatin, supra note 9, at 146-47.  
 
19
 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00-.12 (McKinney 2009); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 (1980).  
  Outside of criminal law and the scope of this Note’s discussion, the Visual Artists 
Rights Act (“VARA”) and the Hague Convention specifically address the deliberate destruction of 
works of art. VARA, which appears within the federal copyright code, allows living artists to seek 
damages for the intentional destruction of their work of visual art if it is of recognized stature. 17 
U.S.C. § 106A (2006); see also 17. U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining the “work[s] of visual art” VARA 
protects). Case law and commentary attest to the limited and narrow rights VARA grants artists. See, 
e.g., Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 565 F. Supp. 2d 245, 258 (D. 
Mass. 2008) (concluding that courts should interpret VARA narrowly because “expansive 
application” of the rights were “not contemplated by Congress and generally [have] not been 
countenanced by the courts”); infra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of 
ascertaining the “recognized stature” standard). 
  The 1954 Hague Convention binds its parties during wartime “to prohibit, prevent and, 
if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of 
vandalism directed against, cultural property.” Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflit, art. 4(3), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, available at http://portal.unesco.org/ 
en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html; see also Patty 
Gerstenblith & Lucille Roussin, Art and International Cultural Property, 42 INT’L LAW. 729, 729-
30 (2008). The United States joined the convention on September 25, 2008. 154 CONG. REC. S9555 
(daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008); see also College Art Association, CAA News, http://www.collegeart.org/ 
news/2008/10/02/us-ratifies-treaty-to-protect-cultural-property-in-time-of-war/ (last visited Jan. 14, 
2009) (providing a brief background to the recent ratification and an explanation of the 
understandings that accompanied Congress’s adoption of the convention). For a general discussion 
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prohibiting willful and unauthorized destruction of another person’s 
property.20 A financial calculation of loss determines the offense’s degree 
and sentence.21 Even when an attack on an artwork results in monetary 
loss far higher than grading thresholds, criminal mischief sentences for 
art vandalism are commonly light.22  
Despite existing laws and scholars’ proposals for greater legal 
protections, gaps exist in the law’s apprehension and control of the harm 
caused by intentional attacks on works of art. Even with heightened 
security at museums since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center,23 the incidence of vandalism in museums has not abated.24 To 
address these gaps and this under-controlled crime, this Note argues for 
legal recognition of art vandalism. It finds art vandalism to be distinct in 
its motives and harms from other forms of vandalism. Moreover, the 
seriousness of art vandalism tends to escape and exceed available legal 
protections. For these reasons, this Note suggests how the law can more 
adequately control this crime.  
Part II of this Note defines vandalism generally and art 
vandalism in particular. This section also assesses the differences 
between the two acts and establishes the distinct nature and harms of art 
vandalism. Part III evaluates existing laws’ application to art vandalism. 
It first considers criminal mischief laws, which prohibit property damage 
  
of the convention, see Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation 
of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 245, 259-69 (2006). 
  
20
  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00-.12 (McKinney 2009); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.3 (1980). 
 
21
 52 AM. JUR. 2d Malicious Mischief § 1 (2000).  
 
22
 CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 275. The museum guard who wrote on the Roy Lichtenstein 
painting was charged with criminal mischief in the second degree, which carries a maximum 
sentence of seven years incarceration. Vogel, supra note 4. The sentence was downgraded to three 
years probation with the guard’s guilty plea to the lesser charge of criminal mischief in the fourth 
degree. Certificate of Disposition No. 57904, People v. Walker, No. 93N065146 (June 20, 1994) 
(documenting the arraignment charge as “145.10,” which is criminal mischief in the second degree, 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.10 (McKinney 2009), and the sentence imposed as under “145.00”, which is 
criminal mischief in the fourth degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.00). The Catholic vandal who 
defaced the portrait of the Virgin Mary was fined $250 upon conviction on three misdemeanor 
charges. Mike Claffey, No Jail for Prof in Art Defacing, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 15, 2000, at 36; see also 
infra note 73 and accompanying text.  
 
23
 See Michael A. Gips, Open Spaces in a Tight Spot, SECURITY MGMT., Jan. 1, 2002, at 
47, also available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-24959216_ITM (“In 
general, museums—especially those in metropolitan areas and those with a high profile—have 
reacted to September 11 by increasing access controls . . . [including] ‘a positive bag check of all 
containers brought in through the public entries.’” (quoting a museum security consultant)). More 
generally, an article about security at a major New York City museum concluded that “[t]he events 
of Sept. 11 changed everyone’s thinking about the need for protection and how vulnerable any 
structure—particularly one in New York City—could be. Security had to be heightened and 
technology offered a way to do so without increasing the size of the guard force.” Randy 
Southerland, Ancient Artifacts, Modern Technologies, ACCESS CONTROL & SECURITY SYSTEMS, 
May 2003, available at http://securitysolutions.com/mag/security_ancient_artifacts_modern/. The 
museum’s Assistant Director for Security and Technology further commented: “Securing the 
museum is very different than securing just a regular office building . . . . The museum . . . is for the 
people, open to the public and made available to everyone. There’s no way to screen out people who 
may be visiting for other than good reasons.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 
24
 See infra app. 
586 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2 
 
and destruction. Next, this section reviews library offenses, which 
prohibit damage to library property and, in some states, to artworks in 
museums. The evaluation of these extant laws demonstrates that they do 
not adequately protect against art vandalism, yet they provide guidance 
as to how the law should be amended. This Note’s proposal in Part IV 
draws from the previous sections’ analysis to outline how criminal 
mischief statutes can accommodate and control art vandalism. This 
proposal thus raises art vandalism’s status to that of a rightful subject of 
the law. It treats art vandalism as a crime against property owners and 
against the public. It further allows for sentences that appropriately deter 
and punish the full scope of the crime.  
Before proceeding, it should be clarified that the discussion here 
is limited to applications to the United States’ legal context, even though 
European law and incidents are considered.25 The discussion also refers 
predominantly to studies and materials available in English26 and relies in 
particular on accounts of art vandalism as reported in the press. The 
focus is on vandalism of artworks in museums27 and by extension to 
artworks that have acquired social and cultural value.28 This narrow focus 
  
 
25
 Most studies on art vandalism referred to here consider occurrences of the crime in 
Europe and North America, even when the United States is the focus of the study. While none of the 
studies acknowledge or question their use of European or Canadian facts to comment on the United 
States context, three factors may contribute to this practice: (1) the lack of well-documented 
examples of art vandalism and a need to cumulate all available information; (2) the uniformity of 
laws that regulate art vandalism in European countries, Canada, and the United States; and (3) a 
presumption that conditions relevant to art vandalism are comparable in European countries, Canada, 
and the United States. 
 
26
 Exceptions are European news reports that provide information not available in 
English language publications and a Master’s thesis in French that surveys European studies and 
laws related to art vandalism. See supra notes 2, 15 and infra app. note 314.  
 
27
 This Note uses “museum” as shorthand for both traditional not-for-profit museums as 
well as not-for-profit and non-collecting exhibition spaces, both of which exhibit works of art for the 
public’s benefit and, correspondingly, are vulnerable to art vandalism. The American Association of 
Art Museum Directors promulgates the following definition of art museums, which is applicable 
here: 
 
An art museum is a permanent, not-for-profit institution, essentially 
educational and humanistic in purpose, that studies and cares for works of art, 
and on some regular schedule exhibits and interprets them to the public. Most, 
but not all, art museums have permanent collections from which exhibitions 
are drawn and upon which educational programs are based. 
 
MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 1155-56. To qualify for accreditation from the American 
Association of Museums and for funding from the federal Institute of Museum and Library Services, 
museums must, inter alia, exhibit objects to the public on a regular basis. See id. at 1155; Institute of 
Museum and Library Services, Grant Applicants Eligibility Criteria: Museums, http://www.imls.gov/ 
applicants/museums.shtm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
 
28
 It is assumed that a museum’s decision to own or display an artwork evidences and 
contributes to that work’s social and cultural value. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 
303, 324-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
517 U.S. 1208 (1996) (discussing the Visual Artists Rights Act “recognized stature” requirement); 
Lubner v. City of L.A., 45 Cal. App. 4th 525, 531 (Ct. App. 1996) (inferring that an artwork would 
meet the recognized stature requirement of the Visual Artists Rights Act if the artist had regularly 
exhibited his or her work); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: 
Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act 
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on museum attacks artificially limits the discussion here to a distinct 
class of circumstances and objects. This Note’s nearly exclusive 
discussion of the collective interest in museum artworks, however, is 
meant to add to, not detract from, discussions about the collective 
interest in other forms of cultural property.29 Additionally, the focus here 
on the vandalism of museum artworks is intended to bear on the 
vandalism of publicly valued works of art regardless of their location 
when attacked.30 Finally, the term “art vandalism” is used to refer broadly 
to this act, and while “vandalism” is saddled with derogatory meaning,31 
this commonly used term is employed here as neutral and descriptive. 
More attention to the definition of both vandalism and art vandalism 
follows in the next section. 
II.  BACKGROUND: VANDALISM AND ART VANDALISM  
Vandalism and art vandalism share certain threshold challenges 
for scholars. The study of vandalism generally and art vandalism in 
  
of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 477, 480 n.19 (1990), cited in Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325 
(implying that public display of an artwork proves that the work is of “recognized stature”).  
  Vandalism of artwork in public places, which is outside this Note’s scope, implicates 
ambiguities as to a vandal’s intent and knowledge, which are not present when attacks occur within 
museums or similar institutions dedicated to the preservation and public display of art. Works of art 
displayed in public spaces, for example, can be misconstrued as refuse and their damage or 
destruction can then accordingly be regarded as accidental. See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 287-92. 
 
29
 John Henry Merryman’s discussion of the public interest in cultural property 
expansively encompasses works of art. Merryman, supra note 13, at 341 (defining cultural property 
as “objects that embody the culture” and inclusive of “archaeological, ethnographical and historical 
objects, works of art, and architecture”). In contrast, Patty Gerstenblith excludes works of art from 
her discussion of legal protection in the United States for cultural property, which she defines as 
objects that arise from and express the identity of a particular community or group “regardless of 
whether the object has achieved some universal recognition of its value beyond that group.” Patty 
Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the United 
States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569-70 (1995) (stating that calling an object “art” is a way to confer 
financial and aesthetic value whereas “[c]ultural property is that specific form of property that 
enhances identity, understanding, and appreciation for the culture that produced the particular 
property”). While the distinction between works of art and cultural property is certainly valid, for 
this author, discussions about these objects intersect at the concept of a collective interest in 
property.  
  The focus here on collective interest precludes discussion of the harm artists can 
experience when their work is vandalized. See, e.g., E-mail from Salomé W. Cihlarz to author (July 
20, 2008, 03:25 am EST) (on file with author) (stating that since his painting was vandalized, the 
artist never again has allowed it to be shown in a public exhibition and that the attack left him 
feeling like a “rape victim, . . . [and] it still haunts [him] to this day”); see also infra text 
accompanying note 276. The Visual Artists Rights Act recognizes this harm by granting the 
exclusive right, albeit limited, to living artists to seek damages when their artwork is either mutilated 
or destroyed. See supra note 19.  
 
30
 E.g., see infra note 240. 
 
31
 See infra notes 38 and 61 and accompanying text. Some scholars have chosen to use 
different terms. David Freedberg uses “iconoclasm” to root his discussion in the power of images, 
rather than the destruction of property. See generally FREEDBERG, supra note 10. Gary Alan Fine 
and Deborah Shatin use “crimes against art” to highlight the illegality of the conduct. Fine & Shatin, 
supra note 9, at 136. Dario Gamboni uses “destruction of art” as a more neutral term. GAMBONI, 
supra note 9, at 19-20. 
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particular suffers from a lack of uniform definition32 and dearth of 
research on the subject.33 Property owners tend to underreport acts of 
vandalism.34 This underreporting prevents scholars from presenting a true 
picture of the prevalence and the actual costs of both types of attacks.35 
Moreover, both vandalism and art vandalism tend to be labeled as 
“senseless” acts.36 The differences, however, between the object, scope, 
  
 
32
 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3, 17, 19-22; Claude Lévy-Leboyer, Vandalism and 
the Social Sciences, in VANDALISM: BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS 1, 2 (Claude Lévy-Leboyer, ed., 
1984); Gabriel Moser et al., The Evaluation of Acts of Vandalism, in VANDALISM: BEHAVIOR AND 
MOTIVATIONS, supra, at 247, 247; Willem van Vliet, Vandalism: An Assessment and Agenda, in 
VANDALISM: BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS, supra, at 13, 17-21. 
 
33
 See Stanley Cohen, Sociological Approaches to Vandalism, in VANDALISM: 
BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS, supra note 32, at 51, 52; FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 7; GAMBONI, 
supra note 9, at 10, 13; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 1; Lévy-Leboyer, supra note 32, at 1-2 (noting 
the lack of theoretical studies of vandalism); van Vliet, supra note 32, at 13, 27 (also noting that 
most studies on vandalism lack a theoretical basis); John Dornberg, Art Vandals: Why Do They Do 
It?, ARTNEWS, Mar. 1987, at 102, 104 (“Research into [art vandalism] is surprisingly skimpy, 
especially in light of the immense cultural and financial losses involved, and little information is 
available.”). Specific types of vandalism recognized as distinct crimes, such as graffiti, computer 
crimes, and hate crimes, receive more attention from legal scholars than the study of vandalism as a 
general phenomenon. See generally Marisa A. Gómez, The Writing on our Walls: Finding Solutions 
Through Distinguishing Graffiti Art from Graffiti Vandalism, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 633 (1993); 
Lori L. Hanesworth, Are They Graffiti Artists or Vandals? Should They Be Able or Caned?: A Look 
at the Latest Legislative Attempts to Eradicate Graffiti, 6 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 
225 (1996); Xiaomin Huang et al., Computer Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 285 (2007); James B. 
Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Hate Crimes: A Critical Perspective, 22 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1997); 
Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes Legislation 
Are Wrong, 40 B. C. L. REV. 739 (1999). 
 
34
 Administrators of schools, parks, and museums alike underreport acts of vandalism in 
order to deflect responsibility for the acts. See Cohen, Campaigning Against Vandalism, supra note 
15, at 231-32; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3. Victims of vandalism and of art vandalism also 
underreport the crime to avoid copycat attacks. See Cohen, Campaigning Against Vandalism, supra 
note 15, at 253 (“[T]he initial reporting of an incident often has the effect of triggering off incidents 
of a similar kind.”); Fine & Shatin, supra note 9, at 137; Kaufman, supra note 1 (“Originally the 
museum hoped to keep the vandalism secret, because . . . ’[m]useums are always afraid that this kind 
of publicity may encourage other acts of vandalism.’” (quoting the Museum of Modern Art’s press 
officer)). Art museums may also underreport vandalism because the attacks “brutally expose[] the 
contradiction between the conservation and mediation that is inherent in the function of museums, 
[and have a] negative impact on the image of the institution, the careers of curators and their future 
collecting and exhibiting activities . . . .” GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 193. As to general vandalism, 
the anonymous nature of the act also contributes to its underreporting. See Cohen, Campaigning 
Against Vandalism, supra note 15, at 254 (vandalism “is overwhelmingly a group offence”); 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 3 (“many victims elect not to report vandalistic acts because 
they . . . have not themselves witnessed the act”); see also FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 7, 10 
(expressing concern rhetorically that discussing vandalism of artworks publicly, even in an academic 
setting, might encourage attacks and noting the fear of copycat attacks may arise from awareness, 
however unconscious, that the impulse to destroy artworks resides in all of us). 
 
35
 FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 39 n.8 (noting anecdotally the reluctance of museum 
curators to provide the author with access to files on works damaged by vandalism, even though 
these curators understood that the topic was important to study); van Vliet, supra note 32, at 16 
(noting that the confusion over what constitutes vandalism as a general phenomenon also impedes 
accurate calculations of its financial impact). 
 
36
 See, e.g., T. C. Wingate, Letter to Editor, Insane Assaults, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 24, 
1978, at 7 (characterizing attacks on significant works of art as “senseless atrocities” and 
“psychopathic outbursts”). But see Michael Kimmelman, A Symbol of Freedom and a Target for 
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, at B7 (acknowledging that art vandalism arises from a variety 
of motives and is not merely an act of insanity); see also FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 11, 24; 
GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 10 (observing that the perception of art vandalism as senseless implies 
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and nature of vandalism and art vandalism suggest the need for distinct 
legal recognition for the particular risks and harms art vandalism 
presents. 
A. Vandalism 
As the definition of vandalism has broadened, scholars’ 
understanding of the conduct’s scope has varied.37 Vandalism once 
referred specifically to the destruction of art monuments and artifacts in 
reference to what were considered the ignorant and barbarous acts of the 
Vandals, an East German tribe that invaded and pillaged cities and 
territories in the fourth and fifth centuries.38 Today, the term vandalism 
refers to the destruction or damage to any form of property.39 Some 
scholars embrace this expansive definition and address vandalism across 
a broad spectrum of conduct from trivial, normalized acts to acts 
recognized as criminal.40 Examples of normalized acts of vandalism 
include throwing eggs at cars on Halloween or writing messages on a 
nightclub’s bathroom stall.41 Acts of unacceptable and criminalized 
vandalism include breaking shop windows, committing arson, and 
slashing automobile tires.42 Other scholars narrow vandalism to these 
illegal manifestations,43 which criminal codes define as intentional acts of 
  
that “[n]othing can be learnt from it, and it must be condemned, or better still ignored”); Lévy-
Leboyer, supra note 32, at 1, 4; Fine & Shatin, supra note 9, at 139, 144-46. 
 
37
 See van Vliet, supra note 32, at 17-19 (“The literature on vandalism shows little 
consensus as to what constitutes vandalistic behaviour.”). 
 
38
 See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 33-34; GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 
15, 18; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 17.  
 
39
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1588 (8th ed. 2004).  
 
40
 See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 23; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 
17, 19-22; van Vliet, supra note 32, at 17-21. Stanley Cohen’s broad typology of vandalism is 
arguably the most influential and is widely referenced in scholarship about both vandalism and art 
vandalism. See CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 242, 244, 249 (1994); DARIO GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 
22; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 20-21, 33-34; Lévy-Leboyer, supra note 32, at 2-3 (citing Cohen 
as having drawn up the “definitive list of vandalism types”); van Vliet, supra note 32, at 18; Cordess 
& Turcan, supra note 7, at 95. 
 
41
 In Stanley Cohen’s typology, the Halloween example would be tolerated as “ritual” 
vandalism and the bathroom stall example would be considered as vandalism “written-off” by the 
nightclub owners. See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 23-24, 27-30. Other categories 
of normalized acts include “play,” “protected” and “walled-in” vandalism, the last of which refers to 
trivial and routine acts of vandalism directed at institutions such as schools, workplaces, and prisons. 
See id. at 24-27, 30-33. Since Stanley Cohen identified “walled-in” or “institutional vandalism,” 
vandalism directed at particular institutions has been recognized as a distinct type of vandalism that 
may or may not be perpetrated by the institution’s own population. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 3307(a)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 2008) (defining institutional vandalism as knowingly damaging a 
place of worship, cemetery, or school); cf. Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 30-33 
(finding at that time that institutional vandalism was “rarely defined as deviant by the wider 
society”). 
 
42
 See, e.g., Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 41-49. 
 
43
 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 22 (“Vandalism is an intentional act of 
destruction or defacement of property not one’s own.”). 
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damage to tangible property belonging to another person.44 Both broad 
and narrow definitions allow scholars to consider vandalism in a wide 
range of physical settings.45  
Notwithstanding the range of vandalistic behaviors scholars 
consider, scholars’ studies converge on vandals’ characteristics and 
motives. There is also general uniformity to theories on vandalism’s 
underlying causes. Accordingly, these commonalities form the 
mainstream academic conception of vandalism.46 Within this academic 
conception, vandalism can serve or accompany purposes such as theft or 
a political cause,47 but vandalism as understood by scholars more 
commonly involves only damage to property belonging to another person 
or entity.  
Most studies find the typical vandal is male, young (under 
twenty-five years old),48 and acts spontaneously and anonymously in 
groups.49 The young vandal defaces, damages, or destroys property he 
encounters in public spaces (parks, playgrounds, public housing, public 
transportation, or on the street) and in institutional facilities (schools and 
libraries).50 The attacks are typically small-scale acts, not calculated to 
cause great damage or loss.51 Additionally, those vandals who engage in 
  
 
44
 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00-.12 (McKinney 2009) (stating in pertinent part: 
“[a] person is guilty of criminal mischief . . . when, with intent to damage property of another 
person, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he 
damages property of another person.”). 
 
45
 The primary settings considered are educational institutions (see Colin Ward, Notes on 
the Future of Vandalism, in VANDALISM, supra note 15, at 276, 290-99); recreational areas (see H. 
H. Christensen, Vandalism: An Exploratory Assessment of Perceived Impacts and Potential 
Solutions, in VANDALISM: BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS, supra note 32, at 269, 269); public 
housing (see Ward, supra, at 287-88; Jack K. Wawrzynski, Vandalism in Residential Areas in 
England: Oldham Case Study, in VANDALISM: BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS, supra note 32, at 283, 
283); public amenities (see Cohen, Campaigning Against Vandalism, supra note 15, at 254-55; C. L. 
Markus, British Telecom Experience in Payphone Management, in VANDALISM: BEHAVIOR AND 
MOTIVATIONS, supra note 32, at 311); public transportation (see Cohen, Campaigning Against 
Vandalism, supra note 15, at 250-53). 
 
46
 These scholars also discuss non-conventional forms of vandalism. For a survey of 
“ecovandalism,” destructive, yet usually sanctioned, acts to the environment, see GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 15, at 87-91. See also infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 
47
 See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 42-44 (noting also that 
“acquisitive” vandalism (that which involves theft) and “ideological” and “tactical” vandalism (that 
which serves a political cause or a desire to be sheltered in prison) are more often perpetrated by 
adults). 
 
48
 See id. at 50; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 23-26; Ward, supra note 45, at 279. 
Statistics from the Federal Bureau of Investigation support this claim and show that sixty-eight 
percent of vandalism arrests in 2006 involved persons under twenty-five years of age. U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2006, Sept. 2007, 
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_41.html. 
 
49
 See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 50; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 
24, 27 (citations omitted). 
 
50
 See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 50; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 
24, 27-29 (pointing out that because vandals tend not to understand the consequences of their 
behavior, they consider property that is public as belonging to no one). 
 
51
 See Lévy-Leboyer, supra note 32, at 7. But small-scale attacks add up in the 
aggregate, and one scholar suggests that “the costs appear to be staggering.” van Vliet, supra note 
32, at 16; see also id. at 15, Table 1; David A. Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J.L. & 
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attacks recognized as serious, harmful, and illegal tend to be motivated 
by aggression.52 They channel that aggression into acts of vandalism that 
seek out revenge, aim to get a message across, mirror play, or arise from 
outright hostility.53 Scholars tend to identify the causes of this aggression 
as boredom and a lack of opportunity to express or advance oneself54 and 
find that acts of vandalism function as a type of challenge for bored 
youth.55 Furthermore, the sense of control vandals gain over the property 
they damage or destroy—objects that symbolize the society or institution 
to which vandals belong—counters the control the vandals perceive 
society or institutions hold over them.56 Finally, the nature of a young 
person’s perception of and interaction with his surrounding physical and 
social environment influences his choice to engage in aggressive acts of 
vandalism.57 
B. Art Vandalism 
Art vandalism, as a particular form of vandalism, differs from 
the general form in its assailants, their motives, and scholars’ theories of 
its causation. These differences are determined and shaped above all by 
what is attacked—a work of art—the nature of which differs significantly 
from the typical vandalized object. The particular nature of artworks, 
along with art vandalism’s historical sources, can complicate even what 
one chooses to call attacks on art.58 Typologies of art vandalism can also 
be complex endeavors, especially when broad definitions are adopted.59 
In contrast, this Note, because it focuses specifically on unauthorized 
acts intended to cause harm to artworks in museums, necessarily uses a 
narrowed definition that accordingly clarifies the type of assailants, 
  
ECON. 611, 633 (1999) (citing 1974 figures for vandalism costs, including arson, at $1.90 billion per 
year). 
 
52
 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 38; Lévy-Leboyer, supra note 32, at 9. 
 
53
 See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 43-50. Cohen also recognizes 
vandalism motivated by the aim to steal or gain attention for a need or cause. See id. at 42-44. As 
these acts employ vandalism to meet other well-defined ends—e.g., theft or shelter—they tend not to 
be considered in discussions about vandalism’s underlying causes or proposals for its prevention. 
See Cohen, Campaigning Against Vandalism, supra note 15, at 254 (excluding “acquisitive” and 
“tactical” vandalism from the assessment of whether publicity and deterrence are effective means to 
control vandalism). 
 
54
 See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 51-53; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, 
at 39-41; Lévy-Leboyer, supra note 32, at 19-10 ; Laurie Taylor, The Meaning of the Environment, 
in VANDALISM, supra note 15, at 54, 63; van Vliet, supra note 32, at 27. 
 
55
 See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 53; Lévy-Leboyer, supra note 32, 
at 10. 
 
56
 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 39-40; Lévy-Leboyer, supra note 32, at 10. 
 
57
 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 15, at 26, 48-49; Lévy-Leboyer, supra note 32, at 1, 5-10; 
Taylor, supra note 54, at 54-58, 62-63.  
 
58
 See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 17-20 (discussing the problematic value judgments that 
are associated with the original meanings and expanded connotations of the two terms “vandalism” 
and “iconoclasm” and the insufficiencies of a standard, more neutral term such as “destruction of 
art”); see also infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
 
59
 See CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 227-48; GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 22-24. 
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motives, and causes to be considered. The discussion that follows, 
however, will review the broader conceptions of art vandalism. It does so 
both to contextualize the attacks on museum artworks and to draw out 
the distinctions between these attacks and vandalism generally.  
Both “vandalism” and “iconoclasm,” the two terms used for the 
intentional destruction of an artwork, carry meanings that pass judgment 
on the act as either abhorred or excusable.60 Calling an act “vandalism,” a 
term that derives from conduct considered ignorant and barbarous, still 
carries moral overtones,61 even as the scope of the term’s meaning has 
broadened.62 For instance, using “vandalism” to describe the demolition 
of monuments and statuary of former communist regimes questions the 
morality of those acts of destruction.63 On the other hand, calling an 
attack on an artwork iconoclasm, a more specialized term, which also has 
historical origins, invests the same act of destruction with meaning and 
purpose.64 In current usage, an iconoclast refers to a maverick,65 a person 
who attacks as fallacious cherished beliefs or venerated institutions.66 
Historically, the term iconoclast referred to a participant in religious and 
political movements that destroyed art objects offensive to their ideals.67 
Thus, the Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan68 
  
 
60
 See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 17-20. Dario Gamboni further compares the distinction 
in common usage between “vandalism” and “iconoclasm” to the difference in usage between 
“pornography” and “eroticism.” Id. at 18.  
 
61
 See id. 18-19; Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobediance, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 520 
(2006) (“We use the label of vandalism in traditional terms to describe expression that is, ironically, 
devoid of any expressive value; work that is deemed ‘vandalism’ . . . is considered to be a symptom 
of public blight, a sign of angry, wayward youth and criminality.”). 
 
62
 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 
63
 See, e.g., Christopher Knight, Opinion, When a Government Falls, Its Statues Aren’t 
Spared, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1991, at 1M (“[T]here’s something inherently barbaric about 
destroying any work of art. . . . When sculptures topple, as they are bound to do, they should be 
uprighted—not so the same, spilled beliefs can be stuffed back inside, but so we can examine their 
shape and contour for illuminating signs of what they once held.”); see also GAMBONI, supra note 9, 
at 51-55, 67-90 (analyzing the treatment of communist monuments by officials and individuals as a 
form of iconoclasm).  
 
64
 GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 19 (“In contrast [to “vandalism”], ‘iconoclasm’ and 
‘iconoclast’ have the advantage of implying that the actions or attitudes thus designated have a 
meaning.”). 
 
65
 For example, the cable television program “Iconoclasts” defines the individuals it 
portrays as “creative visionaries whose passion for what they do has transformed our culture.” 
Sundance Channel, http://www.sundancechannel.com/iconoclasts#/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2008). 
 
66
 See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 18, 338 (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 609 
(7th ed.)).  
 
67
 Unlike the Vandals, iconoclasts acted not as a single conquering people but as part of 
movements, organized by the Byzantine Church (8th-9th centuries) and Puritan Reformation 
movement (16th-17th centuries), and during the French Revolution (18th century), that destroyed 
pictorial objects or cultural artifacts and monuments to serve political and religious ideals. See 
FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 9-10 (discussing in particular the Dutch 16th-century movement); 
GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 28-36; Julius S. Held, Alteration and Mutilation of Works of Art, S. ATL. 
Q., Winter 1963, at 1, 5-6; see also MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 618-21. Iconoclasm is used 
more frequently to figuratively describe attacks on ideas, yet in common usage it can still refer to 
physical attacks on objects. See, e.g., Artner, supra note 9. 
 
68
 See, e.g., Larry B. Stammer, West, Islamic Leaders Decry Taliban’s Statue 
Demolition, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at A4 (“The demolition of the towering statues in Bamian 
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was iconoclasm (even if derided as vandalism),69 as was the 2003 
toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad.70  
The contradictory concepts embedded in the terms 
“vandalism”—acts that are senseless and condemned—and 
“iconoclasm”—acts that have purpose and may thus be excusable—can 
shape how we judge intentional damage done to works of art. Museum 
officials and the press, for example, frequently label attacks on artworks 
as “senseless” and psychotic, and thus impenetrable and uncontrollable.71 
These labels can serve practical ends for those who use them but confuse 
the common and legal understandings of intentional acts to damage or 
destroy works of art.72 In the absence of legal definition, these labels and 
  
province, as well as the ruination of every other non-Islamic religious piece of art in the country, was 
ordered Monday by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban’s supreme leader. ‘These idols have been 
gods of the infidels,’ he declared.” (quoting the Taliban’s leader)); see also Ed Timms, Tearing 
Down the Temples; Clashes Between Cultures Often Leave Places of Worship in Ruins, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 29, 2001, at 1J (“[T]he recent destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 
Afghanistan may be more of a political act than a religious statement. . . . [T]he Taliban may have 
threatened to destroy the Buddhist statues because its leaders were angry at the United Nations’ 
economic sanctions and the refusal by the international community to recognize their government.”); 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 826-27 (2005) (discussing the 
attack’s expressive value). 
 
69
 See, e.g., Barbara Crossette, Taliban: War for War’s Sake, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001, 
at 4 (“Rough-cut and wild-eyed, vandals called the Taliban blasted away last week at works of 
priceless ancient art, the giant standing Buddhas of Bamiyan. The world, including the world of 
Islamic scholarship, was outraged and could barely find the words for what had happened.”); Jeff 
Jacoby, Editorial, Taliban Achieve What They Seek: Uproar, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2001, at A17 
(“UNESCO’s Arab contingent calls it ‘savage.’ . . . The president of the Islamic Center of New 
Delhi . . . labels the Taliban’s actions ‘barbarian politics.’”).  
 
70
 See Andrew Herrmann, Regime Topples, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at 1; Richard 
W. Stevenson, Bush Praises Troops Role in Helping to Free Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A1 
(“Mr. Bush said the toppling of Mr. Hussein’s statue in Baghdad two years ago would rank with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall ‘as one of the great moments in the history of liberty.’”). But see Strahilevitz, 
supra note 68, at 825 (suggesting that the statute’s destruction may have violated international law); 
Louis Freedberg, Editorial, Of Statues and Symbols, S.F. CHRONICLE, Apr. 14, 2003, at B6 (“By 
relentlessly bombing government buildings and tearing down images of Saddam Hussein wherever it 
encountered them, the U.S. must take some responsibility for encouraging the vandalism now 
destroying Iraq.”). 
 
71
 For example, the director of the Whitney Museum of American Art reacted to the 
vandalism of a major artwork at another museum by stating that “[t]here’s little you can do to 
prevent the actions of a mad person.” Carol Vogel, Dutch Vandal Slashes Museums’ Confidence, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1997, at E1 (internal quotation marks omitted). In response to a different 
attack in Amsterdam, the Rijksmuseum’s Director of Public Relations stated: “The assailant and his 
motives are wholly uninteresting to us; for one cannot apply normal criteria to the motivations of 
someone who is mentally disturbed.” GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 195 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also id. at 170 (“[T]he dominant societal stereotype of vandalism was (and is) that 
vandalism is the archetypal instance of ‘motiveless’ action: senseless, wanton, random, 
meaningless.” (quoting Cohen, supra note 33, at 51) (quotation marks omitted)). This is not to say 
that individuals with psychiatric disorders do not vandalize artworks. See, e.g., Ill Man Damages 
Museum Painting, CAPITOL TIMES (Madison, WI), Apr. 5, 2007, at A10. 
 
72
 For instance, museums, which depend on loans and donations of works of art, may 
wish to appear neither responsible for nor vulnerable to attacks. Interview with senior underwriter of 
a leading fine arts insurance company (Jan. 15, 2008); interview with Director of Security at a major 
New York City art museum (Oct. 30, 2007); see also supra note 34. Dario Gamboni further 
considers that museums “[may] wish to deny the existence of reactions that, if considered 
meaningful, must imply some kind of criticism of the museum and of the art or culture it stands for.” 
GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 193. Labeling an attack “senseless” or “insane” serves these ends. See id. 
at 195 (finding that these types of statements are “typical of the way in which judgements [sic] of 
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conflicting moral concepts can transcend the designation of an act as 
criminal and influence how that act is judged by society and by the law.73 
Moral judgment also tends to be passed on acts of art vandalism 
because the objects attacked—works of art—are not neutral objects but 
instead aim to elicit judgment and response in their viewers.74 Among 
other features, emotive power and irreplaceability distinguish works of 
art,75 and these qualities can stir diametrically opposed responses.76 The 
  
psychic abnormality are frequently used to deny relevance and meaning to aggression directed at 
works of art perpetrated within cultural institutions”); Fine & Shatin, supra note 9, at 138 (“The 
designation of insanity shifts blame from the keepers of the art treasures . . . to individual actors . . . . 
By neutralizing or negating these actions, the symbols [i.e., the work of art and the museum] remain 
inviolate. Labeling a deviant social actor as mentally ill reaffirms the cultural and political status 
quo.”); see also Cohen, Campaigning Against Vandalism, supra note 15, at 231-32; GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 15, at 3.  
 
73
 Dario Gamboni recounts, for example, the sympathy held by both the public and the 
judge for the acts of a German art vandal who in 1985 “sprayed shellac on three paintings [that 
depict] homosexual practices,” even while the judge ultimately condemned the man for the crime. 
GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 196. The lenient sentencing of a Catholic man who defaced a 
controversial painting of the Virgin Mary, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, suggests that the 
judge felt the crime was mitigated by its intended iconoclastic purposes. The judge characterized the 
attack on the painting as “‘an intolerant act, however well-intentioned it might have been, that is not 
in keeping with the core value of our society.’” Claffey, supra note 22. (emphasis added). He further 
reasoned that the attack “was a crime committed not out of hate but out of love for the Virgin Mary.” 
Christopher Francescani, Judge Has Mercy on “Virgin” Defiler, N.Y. POST, Nov. 15, 2000, at 32. 
The judge sentenced the man to a $250 fine on conviction for three misdemeanor counts, rejecting 
the prosecutor’s recommendations for probation, community service, and sensitivity training as well 
as the prosecutor’s request for a protective order to bar the man from the museum where the attack 
took place. Claffey, supra note 22. The battle over labeling an act as vandalism or iconoclasm is also 
apparent in the report on the trial of a man who beheaded a statute of the former British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. See Christian Gysin, This Act of Sabotage, DAILY MAIL (London), July 
5, 2002, at 20, 21; see also infra notes 102 and 106 and accompanying text. The defendant 
reportedly told the court that his act was in protest of global capitalism and that his “intention was to 
have a day in court and ‘highlight his concerns about the future of the world and the future of his 
two-year-old son.’” Gysin, supra. The defendant also said in his defense, “‘I haven’t really hurt 
anybody, it’s just a statue an idol we seem to be worshipping . . . .’” Id. Baroness Thatcher’s quoted 
reaction, however, distanced the act from its alleged political meaning: “‘I thought it was 
appalling . . . . It’s what vandals do. Politics is about persuading people to reason not by acts of 
sabotage like this.’” Id.  
 
74
 See Dornberg, supra note 33, at 105 (“Artworks are never attacked at random . . . . 
Each piece of [vandalized] art was a specific target because it provoked—emotionally, socially or 
politically” (quoting art historian Dario Gamboni) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roberta 
Smith, Why Attack Art? Its Role Is to Help With Problems, Not Become a Problem, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 13, 2004, at E1 (“Art’s job is to provoke thought in ways that are difficult to resolve and 
uncomfortable; it’s a relatively neutral place to experience the unresolvable issues that dominate real 
life, to practice a kind of abstract flexibility that might move us toward resolution in real life.”). 
 
75
 For discussion of the emotive power of artworks see, e.g., L. TOLSTOY, WHAT IS ART? 
51 (A. Maude, trans., 1960) (1897) cited in Jennifer Jaff, Law and Lawyer in Pop Music: A Reason 
for Self-Reflection, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 659, 660 (1986); John Henry Merryman, The Public 
Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 348 (1989). For the recognition of artworks’ 
irreplaceability, see, e.g., Patricia Failing, Picking Up the Pieces: The Case of the Dismembered 
Masterpieces, ARTNEWS, Sept. 1980, at 68, 74 (associating the “the growth of respect and 
appreciation for the integrity of works of art” with, inter alia, the extinction of the passenger pigeon 
in 1914, finding “[t]he realization dawned that the last pigeon’s demise had opened a permanent hole 
in the seam of evolution comparable to the unbridgeable voids in history left by destruction and 
mutilation of unique artistic achievements”); see also GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 121-26 (discussing 
the traditional expectation that artworks be rare objects stands in contrast to the advent of modern 
technologies and avant-garde art).  
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most successful and treasured examples of artworks evoke the response, 
and the convention, to value and preserve them.77 To destroy an object 
others cherish perverts this response and social norm.78 There is great 
symbolic power, then, in an attack on a work of art that society has 
chosen to preserve and venerate. An attack on an artwork assaults the 
  
  It is important to note, however, that artworks are not uniformly unique, irreplaceable 
objects, and thus it would be inaccurate to use irreplaceability as a defining feature of an artwork. 
For example, the artist Felix Gonzalez-Torres’ “public sculptures” are installations comprised of 
“endless” stacks of printed paper, pages of which the public is encouraged to take and the exhibiting 
institution is asked to replenish. See Robert Storr, Interview with Felix Gonzalez-Torres, ARTPRESS, 
Jan. 1995, at 24-32, available at http://www.queerculturalcenter.org/Pages/FelixGT/FelixInterv.html 
(“It wasn’t just about trying to problematize the aura of the work or it’s [sic] originality, because it 
could be reproduced three times in three different places and in the end, the only original thing about 
the work is the certificate of authenticity. I always said that these were public sculptures . . . .” 
(quoting Felix Gonzalez-Torres explaining his “stack” sculptures)). Other examples of Gonzalez-
Torres’ work, such as his candy sculptures, use mass-produced objects expressively to evoke 
irreplaceability and permanent loss. As floor installations of mass-produced wrapped hard candies, 
the candy sculptures disappear over the course of their exhibition as the viewing public takes and 
consumes pieces of the candy. Hamza Walker, The Renaissance Society, Felix Gonzalez-Torres: Traveling, 
http://renaissancesociety.org/site/Exhibitions/Essay.Felix-Gonzalez-Torres-Traveling.83.html (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2009). Gonzalez explained that “[t]here was no other consideration involved [in 
making the candy sculptures] except that I wanted to make art work that could disappear, that never 
existed, and it was a metaphor for when Ross was dying. . . . I didn’t want it to last, because then it 
couldn’t hurt me.” Id. For images of the candy sculptures, see The Renaissance Society, 
http://renaissancesociety.org/site/Exhibitions/Images.Felix-Gonzalez-Torres-Traveling.83.html (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2008). While most artworks are irreplaceable, this is a quality that some artworks 
subvert, and thus irreplaceability or uniqueness does not uniformly distinguish works of art from 
other objects. Moreover, there is no evidence that art vandals seek to attack artworks because they 
are irreplaceable. In fact, a vandal has attacked Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain (1917, 1964), an art 
object made from a mass-produced urinal, revered as “the cornerstone of Conceptual Art” and for 
making an “assault on rarity.” GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 125-26, 279-80 (recounting and analyzing 
the vandal’s first attack on Duchamp’s Fountain); Alan Riding, Conceptual Artist as Vandal: Walk 
Tall and Carry a Little Hammer (or Ax), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at B7 (discussing the vandal’s 
first and second attacks on Fountain and mentioning that the artist made eight replicas of the work 
after the original 1917 version was lost).  
 
76
 See Cordess & Turcan, supra note 7, at 98 (“[A]ll art is vulnerable and all art should 
provoke some response.” (quoting a respondent to the authors’ study of the susceptibility of artworks 
to vandalism) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Held, supra note 67, at 6-8. 
 
77
 See FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 35 (“When we are moved by an image . . . our 
natural response is one of protectiveness. The image . . . enhances our emotions, sparks our 
intelligence, arouses meaningful evocation; and so we must shelter it, protect it, conserve it. These 
things and the fact that a work may be acknowledged as a masterpiece, as the greatest product of a 
nation, as extraordinarily valuable (even in the monetary sense alone); even the fact that it is housed 
in a grand or public institution reinforces the inclination to make of the work an object which we 
preserve against ravage.”); Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as Public Duty: The Abbé Grégoire 
and the Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1168-69 (1990) (finding the notion and practice 
to preserve cultural objects originated at the time of the French Revolution); Held, supra note 67, at 
26 (quoting Johann Wolfgang von Goethe from the Propylaen: “‘Works of art are the property of 
mankind and ownership carries with it the obligation to preserve them.’”). 
 
78
 FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 35 (one who attacks an artwork “overturns these 
impulses [to “cling, dote, cherish, preserve”] into their very opposite”); Held, supra note 67, at 26 
(quoting Johann Wolfgang von Goethe from the Propylaen: “‘He who neglects this duty [to preserve 
artworks] and directly or indirectly contributes to their damage or ruin invites the reproach of 
barbarism and will be punished with the contempt of all educated people, now and in future ages.’”). 
But see Gary Schwartz, Ars Moriendi: The Mortality of Art, ART IN AMERICA, Nov. 1996, at 72 
(arguing that far more art objects perish than survive in spite of efforts to preserve them, that art 
objects protected from natural decay by the cultural practice to preserve are not necessarily the past’s 
finest cultural achievements, and that the very cultural practice to preserve causes physical and 
intellectual damage to art objects).  
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social order by targeting objects that embody shared cultural meaning. 
Art objects’ physical fragility and irreplaceability serve to heighten the 
harm caused.79 Furthermore, when an attack targets a museum’s artwork, 
the attack also assaults that institution, the values it symbolizes, and its 
mission to care for and display works of art for the public’s benefit.80 
Because works of art can embody public meaning, many 
scholars and commentators define art vandalism broadly to include harm 
done by, or with the consent of, artworks’ owners.81 Property ownership 
entitlements, they argue, do not give an art owner, whether a private 
collector or public institution, license to willfully damage or destroy 
significant works of art.82 Notwithstanding economic incentives to care 
for valuable works,83 art owners do damage and destroy their own 
property. Examples include altering or destroying works that offend 
  
 
79
 Art conservators and restorers are typically recruited to address the damage caused by 
vandalism. See, e.g., Suzanne Muchnic, Uffizi Gallery Bombing: Binding Up the Wounds, L.A. 
TIMES, June 7, 1993, at 6F (reporting on the planned repair to the over thirty works of art damaged 
in the bombing of Italy’s Uffizi Gallery). For a brief overview of the profession including the 
differences between art conservation and art restoration, see Sarah E. Botha, Art Conservation: 
Problems Encountered in an Unregulated Industry, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 251, 259-62 (2003). No 
documentation exists on the number of vandalized works that have been successfully restored. 
Studies and the press have made anecdotal mention of irreparable damage or of damage that remains 
visible even after restoration. See, e.g., Held, supra note 67, at 5 (“The damage [several slashes to a 
painting on canvas] since has been mended, but once one knows the history of the picture [The 
Rokeby Venus], one easily can detect the traces of these wounds when examining the original 
painting.”); M. Kirby Talley, Jr. Rembrandt’s Danaë: After 12 Years of Painstaking Restoration 
following a Vandal’s Brutal Attack, the Painting Still Sings, Albeit Somewhat More Softly Than 
Before, ARTNEWS, Summer 1998, at 88, 90 [hereinafter Talley, Rembrandt] (“Up close, and viewed 
in raking light, traces of the gutters and pitting caused by the acid splashing over and running down 
the painting can still be seen. It would have been impossible to hide such scars completely without 
carrying out a total restoration that would have ultimately ended in falsification.”); Kiss Is Just a 
Kiss, Not a Cy, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 10, 2007, at C10 (“Restorers have tried to remove the lipstick 
smudge from the bone-white canvas using nearly 30 products—to no avail.”).  
 
80
 See supra notes 11 and 27. 
 
81
 See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 147-49; SAX, supra note 13, at 7-8; Avis Berman, Art 
Destroyed: Sixteen Shocking Case Histories, CONNOISSEUR, July 1989, at 74, 74. Destruction of a 
work by its artist, however, is not considered vandalism if the artist is the sole owner of the work. 
See CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 227; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 68, at 830-35 (discussing the 
rationales for artists’ right to destroy their own creative work as long as it has not been published or 
publicly displayed). Artists may also destroy their own work under moral rights statutes. See Edward 
J. Damich, State “Moral Rights” Statutes: An Analysis and Critique, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 
291, 300 & n.46 (1989) (explaining that all state moral rights statutes permit artists to violate the 
integrity of their own work).  
 
82
 See SAX, supra note 13, at 4 (“Despite the powers that owners have to do as they wish 
with the objects that they own, public attitudes reflect an understanding that is in advance of legal 
theory. A sense that the fate of some objects is momentous for the community at large has certainly 
insinuated itself into the public consciousness.”); Berman, supra note 81, at 74, 
(“Perhaps . . . standard property rights do not apply to unique works of art with aesthetic, historical, 
or documentary interest, because these come to have an intrinsic quality that no one can buy.”); 
Held, supra note 67, at 26. But see Strahilevtiz, supra note 68, at 785 (defending owners’ right to 
destroy their property in circumstances that promote “expressive interests, spur creative activity, and 
enhance social welfare”).  
  
83
  See Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical 
Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 224-25 (2007) (arguing generally that the market for cultural 
property should remain unregulated as is the market for works of art, in part because financial value, 
not regulation, incentivizes owners of art objects to care for them). 
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taste;84 cutting works when the fragments can be sold for greater profit;85 
and failing to protect works from obvious and known risks of harm.86 
In contrast, the conventional definition of art vandalism, the 
focus of discussion here, refers to intentional acts to damage or destroy 
works of art done without the right or the owner’s consent.87 This 
definition corresponds to notions of traditional property entitlements and 
existing criminal law.88 Scholars, the press, and owners of vandalized 
artworks distinguish serious attacks, which gain their attention and 
concern, from minor acts, which follow patterns of vandalism as a 
general phenomenon89 and tend to be “written-off,”90 despite being illegal 
and having the potential to cause costly damage.91 It is the serious 
attacks, those calculated to alter or destroy the artwork they target, which 
are likewise the subject of discussion here. Serious acts of art vandalism 
broadly fall under two categories; however, many acts share 
characteristics of both. One category, “tactical,”92 comprises attacks that 
seek to bring attention to a political cause. Designed to cause public 
outrage and fear, tactical vandalism targets works of art held in high 
public regard. The other category, “expressive,”93 comprises attacks 
  
 
84
 CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 234-35; GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 149-64 (discussing 
instances when offense to public tastes has led to the destruction, alteration, and dismantling of art in 
public places); SAX, supra note 13, at 13-20, 35-42; Berman, supra note 81, at 74-81; Held, supra 
note 67, at 8-15.  
 
85
 CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 235-36; Failing, supra note 75, at 68; Held, supra note 67, 
at 16-22. 
 
86
 CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 231-33; Berman, supra note 84, at 75, 80. For discussion of 
harm to works of art resulting from negligent restoration or conservation, see Botha, supra note 79 at 
251; Heidi Stroh, Comment: Preserving Fine Art from the Ravages of Art Restoration, 16 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 239 (2006). 
 
87
 No study has approached the question, presumably due to lack of data, whether 
artworks are more frequently or more severely harmed by non-owners than by owners. 
 
88
 See supra note 44; supra Part III.A. 
 
89
 See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. 
 
90
 As these minor acts tend not to be reported or prosecuted, they fall under Stanley 
Cohen’s category of “written-off” vandalism. See supra note 41. 
 
91
 See Cordess & Turcan, supra note 7, at 97. “Minor” or trivial acts of art vandalism—
”scratching and scribbling with pencils”—tend, like vandalism as a general phenomenon, to be 
anonymous acts perpetrated as the result of “‘daring’ by adolescents or school children.” Id. at 97-
98; see also CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 249 (“Much of the vandalism that occurs in museums is by 
groups of young people who are seeking relief from boredom through pranks, making fun of what 
others regard as serious, competing with friends for attention, or hoping to earn the respect of their 
peers for their courage or creativity. Often their play vandalism is not malicious . . . .”); cf. 
GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 192 (“With modern art . . . very minor interventions such as touching or 
spitting . . . can result in a destruction of the work, without the author of the gesture . . . being 
necessarily conscious of it.”). 
 
92
 This term is borrowed from Stanley Cohen yet combines its features with what he calls 
ideological vandalism. See Cohen, Property Destruction, supra note 15, at 43-44.  
 
93
 This term is comparable to, but is not to be confused with, its use in two recent articles 
on related topics. Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 140, at 1102 (calling expressive those acts of 
lawbreaking that “seek[] to send a strong message about the perceived injustice of existing property 
arrangements”); Strahilevitz, supra note 68, at 786 (calling expressive those destructive acts that 
“gain attention for a cause or message”). 
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motivated by what an artwork depicts or expresses, or by the high social 
value and cultural status it holds.94  
A look at examples of tactical art vandalism—attacks on 
prominent artworks to gain attention for a political cause—sheds light on 
the crime, its assailants, and their motivations. Likely the most widely 
discussed tactical art vandal, Mary Richardson, repeatedly hacked at a 
17th-century painting, The Rokeby Venus, at London’s National Gallery 
in 1914 with a meat chopper.95 Richardson planned the attack to draw 
attention to a fellow suffragist’s hunger strike in prison.96 The attack, like 
many others by the suffrage movement,97 was premeditated and 
deliberate in targeting the painting that Richardson slashed.98 The art 
historian Dario Gamboni suggests that by assaulting unique and 
treasured depictions of human figures, the suffragettes were able to stir 
intense public outcry, like that which might accompany murder, without 
actually harming a human being.99 Strategically, Mary Richardson turned 
  
 
94
 See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 201 (summarizing that “works are simultaneously 
abused because they exemplify fame, value and domination”). 
 
95
 See, e.g., GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 94. To view an image and short history 
of the painting, which is also known as Toilet of Venus, see The National Gallery, 
http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/cgi-bin/WebObjects.dll/CollectionPublisher.woa/wa/work?work 
Number=NG2057 (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). To view an image of the damaged painting before its 
restoration, see GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 94. 
 
96
 See FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 15-16; GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 93-95; Fine & 
Shatin, supra note 9, 141-42; Dornberg, supra note 33, at 102. Restorers repaired the painting after 
the attack, but “one easily can detect the traces of [the] wounds when examining the original 
painting.” Held, supra note 67, at 5. 
 
97
 For example, the Women’s Social and Political Union, to which Ms. Richardson sent 
her statement, “organized between 1912 and 1914 . . . incidents of civil disobedience, guerrilla 
tactics, and open warfare” after the suffrage movement failed to win reforms from the British 
Parliament. GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 95; see also CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 246 (“The 
suffragettes . . . attacked eleven works of art in a five-month period in 1914 . . . .”). 
 
98
 See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 94-96. Richardson prepared a statement prior to the 
attack which reads, in part: 
 
I have tried to destroy the picture of the most beautiful woman in 
mythological history [i.e., Venus] as a protest against the Government for 
destroying Mrs. Pankhurst . . . . [T]he stones cast against me for the 
destruction of this picture are each an evidence against [the public] of artistic 
as well as moral and political humbug and hypocrisy. 
 
Id. at 94-95 (citing Miss Richardson’s Statement, TIMES (London), May 11, 1914).  
 
99
 Id. at 96; see also FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 20, 33 (noting that “[w]e feel especial 
horror at the mutilation of [a] face and eyes . . . , and we are thus provided with deep psychological 
testimony to the labile inclination to respond as if the body [depicted and attacked] were actually 
present,” and, that attacks on portraits can function as a “violent act . . . [that is] relegated to a 
second order of harm; but one which could gain a much lower level of publicity if the act had not 
involved an image”); Cordess & Turcan, supra note 7, at 95 (“Art vandalism may be seen as an 
intermediate form between an attack on a thing and an attack on a person . . . . [Art vandalism] may 
be a particular case of acts of malicious damage providing one substitute for aggression against 
people.”); Chris Cordess, Home Front: The Makings of an Art Vandal, GUARDIAN, Sept. 3, 1994, at 
TT8 (“In some cases, violence to an image is a substitute for an attack on a person. The frequency of 
suicide or attempted suicide by assailants of major artworks emphasises [sic] their desperation: it 
mirrors the high rate of self-destructive acts committed by those who are violent to other people and 
not merely to material objects.”). 
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the public outcry her attack provoked against the public by calling it 
“hypocrisy” for the public to pass moral judgment on the abuse of a 
depiction of a woman, while a real woman suffered in prison for a 
political cause.100  
Other examples of tactical art vandalism include: the 1993 
bombing of Italy’s Uffizi Gallery,101 which sought to destabilize the 
Italian government; the 2002 beheading of a Margaret Thatcher statue, 
which meant to protest global capitalism;102 and the 2007 neo-Nazi attack 
in Sweden on an exhibition of sexually explicit photographs, which 
aimed to battle “the decay of society.”103 Many individuals who attack 
prominent artworks ascribe political reasons to their acts even if, like the 
man who decapitated the Thatcher statue, they are not part of an 
organized political movement,104 or their political cause is personal.105 All 
such attacks, like the suffragette’s, are premeditated, deliberate in their 
  
 
100
 See supra note 98.  
 
101
 The bomb blast, from within a car parked outside the museum, killed five people and 
destroyed a library, museum archive, and several paintings. See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 104-05; 
Robert Hughes, Striking At the Past Itself; Terrorists Bomb the Uffizi, Destroying Lives and 
Precious Artifacts of Civilization, TIME MAGAZINE, June 7, 1993, at 34. 
 
102
 Gysin, supra note 73. The attacker entered the public gallery with a cricket bat 
intending to strike the marble statue which was on view to the public before its planned placement in 
the House of Commons. Id. An image of the statue by Neil Simmons after its attack is available at 
Art Crime, http://www.artcrimes.net/pages/simmons.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). It has since 
been repaired and is reportedly on view at the same gallery where it was vandalized. OFFICIAL 
BOOKLET TO MARK THE UNVEILING ON 21ST FEBRUARY 2007 OF THE BRONZE STATUTE OF 
BARONESS THATCHER SCULPTED BY ANTHONY DUFORT FOR THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 10 (Malcolm 
Hay, ed., 2007), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/Baroness_Thatcher_booklet.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2009). Parliament commissioned another sculptor, Anthony Dufort, to create a 
replacement statue in bronze, which was unveiled in February 2007. Id. For images of and 
information about the new statute, see id.  
 
103
 See Liveleak, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=f59_1191946711 (last visited Jan. 11, 
2009) (hosting video documenting the attack); Swedish National Socialists, Nationalists Act Out 
Against Degenerate Art in Sweden, http://www.den-svenske.com/nationalists_act_out_against_degenerate_ 
art_in_sweden.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2008). Four members of the neo-Nazi group entered the 
gallery during regular business hours and swung at the photographs with crowbars and axes in the 
presence of gallery visitors and staff. Id. The attack destroyed seven of the fourteen exhibited 
photographs by Andres Serrano from his series The History of Sex. Carol Vogel, Gallery Vandals 
Destroy Photos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at E1. Each photograph was originally produced in three 
editions, and the destroyed photographs were expected to be replaced and placed back on display in 
the exhibition. See Russell Smith, You Can Call It Vandalism, Intervention, or Just Plain Art, 
GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 18, 2007 at R1; Vogel, supra. For information about the artist and his work, 
see Artnet, Andres Serrano, http://www.artnet.com/awc/andres-serrano.html (last visited Nov. 2, 
2008). 
 
104
 For example, the man who shot the Leonardo da Vinci drawing in 1987 claimed he 
acted in “‘protest’ against the political, social, and economic conditions in Britain.” Boggan, supra 
note 3; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. After serving a sentence at a maximum 
security mental hospital, however, the man revised his reasons for the attack, claiming that it was a 
“cry for help” and a means to “be taken away and given treatment.” Boggan, supra note 3. 
 
105
 For example, an unemployed man slashed ten Dutch Old Master paintings in 1989 in 
protest of Holland’s employment of foreigners. Talley, Dutch Disaster, supra note 8, at 60-61; 
Slasher Rips Old Paintings, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 30, 1989, at A2. Another unemployed 
man brutally attacked a museum’s most important painting, Rembrandt’s Danaë, with sulfuric acid 
and a knife to avenge the government for denying him public assistance. Talley, Rembrandt, supra 
note 79, at 86 (explaining that the man sought “to destroy something of extraordinary value” and 
asked an attendant to point out the most important painting, which was the Danaë).  
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choice of targets, and calculated to capitalize on the public’s outrage to 
bring attention to a political cause.106  
Reviewing examples of expressive art vandalism adds other 
dimensions to the crime, its perpetrators, and their motives. Whereas 
tactical art vandalism sacrifices an artwork to a political cause, 
expressive art vandalism takes issue with the artwork itself. Provoked by 
an artwork and its social importance, the expressive art vandal typically 
seeks to obliterate artworks for their religious, moral, or political 
imagery;107 social, cultural, or financial status;108 or incomprehensibility.109 
Most expressive attacks, like tactical attacks, are premeditated, directed 
at prominent artworks, and attention-seeking.110 These attacks, in 
  
 
106
 Some scholars compare “tactical” attacks with acts of terrorism as they “are designed 
to indicate that the state and public are vulnerable.” Fine & Shatin, supra note 9, at 138 (“I have tried 
to destroy a valuable picture because I wish to show the public that they have no security for their 
property nor for their art treasures until women are given their political freedom.” (quoting another 
suffragette who also destroyed a painting in 1914) (internal quotation marks omitted)). For more 
examples of tactical art vandalism, see CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 244-48. The Italian attack was 
among several in Italy attributed to the Mafia, which targeted culturally significant monuments and 
works of art as a strategy of political destabilization. See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 104-05; 
Hughes, supra note 101, at 34. (“[A]s an image of unrepentant terrorist power striking back against 
the Italian state, the bombing of the Uffizi could hardly have been improved upon. . . . [I]f you want 
to make your power felt, a good way to do it is by destroying something that, unlike human life, is 
not even notionally a renewable resource. That ‘something’ is the sense of a readily accessible past, 
without which there is no memory and no civilization.”). While the man who beheaded the statue of 
Margaret Thatcher underestimated the amount of outrage his act prompted, he intended to have a day 
in court to “‘highlight his concerns about the future of the world and the future of his two-year-old 
son.’” Gysin, supra note 73. The neo-Nazi group videotaped and promoted the attack by uploading 
the video on the YouTube website in October 2007. The Local: Sweden’s News in English, Google 
Blocks “Pornographic” Video of Art Attack, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.thelocal.se/8746/20071010/ 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008). The video threatens subsequent attacks and encourages others to “[j]oin 
the fight against the decay of society!” Liveleak, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=f59_1191946711 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2009). The video has since been removed from the YouTube website. The 
Local: Sweden’s News in English, supra.  
 
107
 For example, the man who defaced a portrait of the Virgin Mary by spreading white 
paint over its surface reportedly sought to “‘clean the painting,’” which he found “‘abusive.’” 
Santiago et al., supra note 6; see also, Chris Cordess, Home Front: The Makings of an Art Vandal, 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 3, 1994, at TT8 (“Of course the history of iconoclasm is that of the destruction of 
religious images, but this is rarely the prime motive nowadays, except for images of the Virgin Mary 
or the Mother And [sic] Child.”). An example of vandalism arising from moral offense is typified by 
a woman who threw a bronze statue at a 19th-century painting on display in a museum because she 
found the painting “filthy.” GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 192-93. A politically-motivated attack 
occurred in 2004, when the Israeli ambassador to Sweden physically assaulted an art installation that 
he felt glorified a suicide bomber. Jonathan Jones, Arts: “It’s Inciting Murder,” GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 
2004, at 14; see also CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 248-49 (reviewing destruction of artworks by their 
owners who were motivated by offense to their moral standards). 
 
108
 Artists most often commit this type of attack and often claim that their acts of 
vandalism constitute independent works of art. See Kastner, supra note 7, at 154.  
 
109
 See Dornberg, supra note 33, at 105 (“Most modern works . . . are assaulted primarily 
because the viewers simply do not understand them, and what you do not understand frustrates you 
and can lead to outbursts of violence and barbarism.” (quoting the art historian Dario Gamboni) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
110
 GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 197, 201 (“Aggressors acting in museums . . . tend to 
desire and enjoy publicity” and they attack prominent artworks “because they exemplify fame, value 
and domination.”); see also FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 25. 
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particular, demonstrate a perversion of the normalized response to 
protect and preserve powerful and prominent works of art.111  
The devout Catholic, who in 1999 smeared white paint on an 
unconventional depiction of the Virgin Mary, typifies an expressive 
vandal motivated by offense to an artwork’s imagery.112 Through this 
transgressive act, the man sought to obliterate or “white-out” the 
painting’s “blasphemous” depiction of the Madonna,113 as well as attack 
the authority the painting gained as part of a widely visited, high profile 
exhibition aptly titled “Sensation.”114 Another form of expressive art 
vandalism attacks artworks’ status and is committed most often by 
artists. Artists who vandalize artworks seek to impugn the cultural 
meaning of prominent artworks, as well as seek recognition for their 
destructive acts as performative works of art themselves.115 The third 
  
 
111
 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Several scholars offer psychological 
explanations when discussing these violent, destructive responses to works of art, offering theories 
that revolve around an individual’s confusion between image and reality, which is triggered by their 
encounter with particularly powerful and evocative works of art. See FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 
11; GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 200 (finding that an individual’s identity crisis can precipitate or 
accompany his attack on a work of art); Held, supra note 67, at 6 (discussing the “belief in the magic 
powers embodied in a work of art” that causes a “confusion between image and reality”); John J. 
Teunissen & Evelyn J. Hinz, The Attack on the Pietà: An Archetypal Analysis, 33 J. AESTHETICS & 
ART CRITICISM, Autumn 1974, at 43-44 (applying psychological theories to the 1972 attack in 
Florence, Italy on Michelangelo’s sculpture of Christ in the lap of the Virgin Mary).  
 
112
 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The neo-Nazi group’s attack on the sexually 
explicit photographs shares some of the motivations of this form of expressive art vandalism. See 
supra notes 103 and 106 and accompanying text.  
 
113
 Robert D. McFadden, Disputed Madonna Painting in Brooklyn Show Is Defaced, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1999, at A1.  
 
114
 See, e.g., Online NewsHour, The Art of Controversy (Oct. 8, 1999), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/entertainment/july-dec99/art_10-8.html. 
 
115
 For example, the art student who vomited on a painting in New York’s Museum of 
Modern Art targeted the painting because it was “oppressively trite and painfully banal art” and 
considered his act a performance piece. Kastner, supra note 7, at 154-55 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text. Another artist spray-painted a large green 
dollar sign on a painting in Amsterdam’s Stedelijk Museum to protest “the power of money over 
art.” Stephanie Cash, Newman’s Cathedra Slashed at Stedelijk, ART IN AMERICA, Jan. 1998, at 27, 
27; Anatoly Korolyov, The Love of Money Is Still Seen As Root of Evil, MOSCOW TIMES, Apr. 30, 
1997; Art Crime, http://www.artcrimes.net/suprematisme-1920-1927 (last visited Jan. 11, 2009) 
(reporting that the artist attacked the work as performance art in protest of “corruption and 
commercialism in the art world”).  
  Artists and other art vandals may defend their acts as protected and thus legally 
permissible forms of expression. See, e.g., Claffey, supra note, 22; Kastner, supra note 7, at 156 
(discussing the defense of artists’ attacks as legitimate forms of expression). First Amendment 
rights, however, do not extend to illegal acts, such as unauthorized damage to property. See 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 
WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 489, 557 (2006) (“Any type of intentional, lasting damage to property 
[“owned by another private party”] . . . is not considered to be within the ambit of First Amendment 
protection, even if it has the potential to communicate expressive activity.”); Strahilevitz, supra note 
68, at 828 (“[T]he law might well view the symbolic destruction of irreplaceable property as low-
value speech that can be restricted in order to facilitate the success of a deliberative process.”). Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz further argues that: “Destroying a unique, irreplaceable piece of property 
is . . . closer to heckling a speaker than to responding to what he has to say. . . . [B]y privileging 
creation over destruction [the government] is establishing a procedural rule that the artist who 
intends to make a lasting aesthetic contribution cannot have her speech cut off without her consent.” 
Id. at 827-28 (footnote omitted).  
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form of expressive vandalism arises from a lack of understanding and 
sense of exclusion “outsiders” to the art community experience when 
confronted with highly praised and valued works of art.116 
In sum, most serious acts of art vandalism, tactical and 
expressive, are perpetrated by individuals, with the exception of some 
political attacks. Those individuals (and, less frequently, the groups) plan 
their attacks to achieve certain results.117 They typically enter museums 
legally, and often have planned how to circumvent museum security.118 
Whether by choice or circumstance, art vandals generally attack in the 
presence of museum visitors and staff.119 In addition, art vandals 
  
  Legal, by way of ownership, but still provocative artworks have been made from 
permanently destroying or altering preexisting works by other artists. Robert Rauschenberg 
famously erased a Willem de Kooning drawing he received for that purpose from the senior and 
more prominent artist. See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 268; YouTube.com, Robert Rauschenberg - 
Erased De Kooning, http://youtube.com/watch?v=tpCWh3IFtDQ (videotaped interview of Robert 
Rauschenberg) (last visited Nov. 4, 2008). The work, Erased DeKooning (1953), is now in the San 
Francisco Museum of Modern Art’s collection. San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 
http://www.sfmoma.org/artwork/25846 (last visited Jan. 11, 2009). A more recent example is Insult 
to Injury (2003), a series of works by the British artists Jake and Dinos Chapman of clown and 
puppy heads drawn on eighty rare prints purchased by the artists of Francisco de Goya’s celebrated 
Disasters of War (1863). See Jonathan Jones, Look What We Did: Weaned on a Diet of Pickled 
Animals and Unmade Beds, the British Public Has Become Remarkably Difficult to Shock, 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 31, 2003, at 2; William Underhill, Going Over Goya, ARTNEWS, Jun. 2003, at 50. 
Notably, the Chapmans’ work was vandalized by another artist. See “Comedy Terrorist” Barschak 
Jailed for Paint Attack, HERALD (Glasgow), Nov. 25, 2003, at 8; Matt Shinn, Arts: Blam! Pow! 
Splat!, GUARDIAN, Nov. 6, 2003, at 10. 
 
116
 See Dornberg, supra note 33, at 106 (“[M]ost viewers simply do not have the 
intellectual capacity or background to comprehend the intention or issues at stake in a work of art. 
And when they do not understand it, they feel excluded or even mocked, and react violently and 
aggressively.” (quoting art historian Dario Gamboni)); see also GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 207-10 
(discussing the 1982 physical assault on an abstract painting at Berlin’s Nationalgalerie and the 
public reaction to it). The museum guard’s defacement of the Roy Lichtenstein painting may also be 
understood as expressive art vandalism. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 
117
 See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 190 (“[E]ntering a museum implies . . . a knowledge 
that [its] objects, generally a public property, are valuable and consequently watched over.”). The 
planning often includes bringing the instrument or material used to destroy the work of art into the 
museum. See, e.g., Boggan, supra note 3 (reporting that the attacker carried a sawed-off shotgun into 
the museum, which he used to shoot the Leonardo da Vinci drawing); Gysin, supra note 73, at 20 
(reporting that the attacker brought a cricket bat into the gallery, which he used to assault the statue); 
Kaufman, supra note 1 (reporting that the attacker used spray-paint to deface the painting); Santiago 
et al., supra note 6 (reporting that the attacker smuggled white paint into the museum by hiding it in 
a hand lotion bottle and used the paint to deface the painting); see also CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 
241 (“The deliberateness of vandals’ actions is often clear from the tools they use to inflict damage 
on art: hammers, hatchets, knives, paint, acid, fire, even bombs.”). 
 
118
 See, e.g., Boggan, supra note 3 (reporting that the attacker “had been [to the museum] 
before, to study [its] locking-up procedure” and on the day he shot the drawing, the attacker waited 
until closing time when “a security guard asked him to leave and then went away to clear the rest of 
the gallery”); Santiago et al., supra note 6 (reporting that the attacker feigned illness to cause the 
guard positioned near the painting to leave the area to seek medical assistance). Scholars have noted 
that museums, as high status institutions, and their museum security measures socialize most people 
not to violate an artwork’s integrity. See CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 240-41 (“Most people who enter 
public places to look at art have not been explicitly taught how to behave in the presence of art, but 
most of them treat the art with respect and do not even consider damaging it. . . . Visitors who do 
touch works of art will probably be told not to by a guard, letting them know that they are not as 
unsupervised as they had thought.”). 
 
119
 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 1 (recounting a sixteen-year-old’s account of the spray-
paint attack on Picasso’s painting at New York’s Museum of Modern Art); Swedish National 
 
2009] FRAMING ART VANDALISM 603 
 
deliberately choose the artworks they attack.120 They select works that 
when attacked will symbolize or substitute for violence against a 
person121 or represent an attack on society or the state.122 Indeed, all 
serious acts of art vandalism, tactical and expressive, target socially 
valued works of art.123 Art vandals thus not only damage or destroy an art 
object, but assault the public value assigned to it. They target artworks at 
museums because of the public value museum display confers.124 By 
intentionally attacking publicly valued artworks in prestigious 
institutions, art vandals gain publicity generated by the public’s 
outrage.125 Many seek the public attention and most claim or do not avoid 
responsibility for their attacks.126 Finally, directly affected parties, as well 
as the legal system, typically misapprehend art vandalism and consider it 
a “senseless” act or, contradictorily, a morally justifiable act.127   
C. Distinguishing Art Vandalism from Vandalism 
The differences between vandalism as a general phenomenon 
and art vandalism in particular call for recognition of art vandalism as a 
distinct form of criminal conduct. Vandalism of an artwork carries 
greater social consequences than vandalism of other types of property. 
Works of art are fragile often irreplaceable objects of collective 
interest.128 Harm to artworks thus threatens to eliminate physical 
  
Socialists, supra note 103 (showing that exhibition visitors and staff were present for the neo-Nazi 
attack). 
 
120
 See supra note 74. 
 
121
 See supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Boggan, supra note 3 (“I sat 
looking at [the Leonardo da Vinci drawing] one day and went away and thought about it during the 
week. I didn’t want to damage myself or anyone else. If I damaged an inanimate object, then that 
would get the feelings out of my system . . . .” (quoting the vandal) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Santiago et al., supra note 6 (“The man who painted [the portrait] showed very poor taste 
and very little respect for the representation of the Virgin Mary. If [the artist] saw a picture of his 
mother depicted in that way, he’d take a knife to the person who made it. He would kill him.” 
(quoting the vandal’s wife, who encouraged her husband to take action against the painting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 
122
 See Fine & Shatin, supra note 9, at 135-36 (“[T]he state or guardian is being attacked 
through the art work. An attack on an art object may be an attack on the community because of the 
perceived connection between the art object and the cultural heritage of the community.”). 
 
123
 Id. (arguing that “it is not art per se that is being attacked,” but the public value the 
artwork embodies and represents). 
 
124
 Museums, by choosing which artworks to collect, exhibit, study, and preserve for the 
public’s benefit, endow the objects they select with recognized public meaning and value. See supra 
note 28. 
 
125
 See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 191. 
 
126
 See id. at 190-91 (observing that vandals at museums display “a greater willingness to 
be recognized as the author[s] of [their own] action and to suffer sequels that follow from it”); 
Cordess & Turcan, supra note 7, at 99-100 (finding that attacks tended to be public events aimed at 
achieving notoriety and that “the contemporary vandal of major artworks rarely seeks to avoid 
detection”). 
 
127
 See supra notes 71 and 73 and accompanying text. 
 
128
 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text; see also SAX, supra note 13, at 24 
(“[W]orks of fine art are more than economic commodities and they oftentimes provide our 
communities with a sense of cohesion and history. The public[] [has an] interest in preserving 
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embodiments of culture.129 Minor attacks on works of art are comparable 
to vandalism as a general phenomenon and are intended to cause only 
trivial harm.130 In contrast, serious acts of art vandalism intend to assault 
intangible, publicly held values in addition to impermissibly invading the 
exclusive property rights of the artworks’ owners. Accordingly, the 
unauthorized intentional destruction of a work of art violates the social 
norm to preserve works of art of public value and violates the social 
norm to protect property rights.131 From a legal standpoint, socially 
valued works of art are “property plus public interest,”132 and art 
vandalism thus threatens both interests. While museums, as the artworks’ 
owners, are frequently its victim, the crime does not target the institution, 
nor even art, but the public value the museum and artwork represent, 
embody, and create.133 The artworks’ intangible value is furthermore 
reflected in their high market value, and thus art vandalism can also 
exact great financial loss.134 Art vandalism additionally places public 
safety at risk. The attacks, especially on figurative artworks, can be seen 
as intermediate or substitute forms of violence against persons.135 
Furthermore, because the attacks generally take place in public, they risk 
endangering bystanders and engendering disorder.136 In some instances, 
art vandalism can also be seen as a form of terrorism.137 For these 
reasons, art vandalism requires laws that address the property it harms 
and the full scope of risks it presents. Consequently, this Note proposes 
that laws designed to deter and redress art vandalism must protect the 
property interests of art owners and the collective interest in objects of 
cultural significance, as well as the public interest in social order and 
public safety.  
  
important artistic creations . . . ” (quoting Letter from Sen. Alan Sieroty to Hon. Edmund G. Brown, 
Jr., Governor of Cal. (Sept. 3, 1982), in support of California’s art preservation legislation)).  
 
129
 See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. 
 
130
 See supra note 91. 
 
131
 See supra notes 77-78 and 87-88 and accompanying text. 
 
132
 John Henry Merryman presaged and promoted special legal treatment for works of art 
in the United States, stating that in Europe “a work of art is different for some legal purposes from 
other objects of property, so that the law of property must be appropriately modified in order to deal 
properly with the special considerations that are raised by works of art.” John Henry Merryman, The 
Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1037 (1976); see also id. at 1037 n.47. 
 
133
 Unlike instances of institutional vandalism, art vandalism does not target the museum 
facility, by for instance breaking windows or other institutional property. See supra note 41.  
 
134
 See infra text accompanying note 166; see also MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 
963 (discussing the “close relation between art world consensus about artistic value and market 
value”). 
 
135
 See supra note 99. 
 
136
 Two accounts in particular shed light on the pandemonium that can accompany attacks 
on artworks in public institutions. Kaufman, supra note 1 (recounting a sixteen-year-old’s account of 
the spray-paint attack on Picasso’s painting at New York’s Museum of Modern Art); Swedish 
National Socialists, supra note 103 (documenting a neo-Nazi group’s masked attack with crowbars 
and axes on an exhibition in a public gallery). 
 
137
 See supra note 106. 
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III. LAWS PROHIBITING UNAUTHORIZED INJURY TO WORKS OF ART 
Currently, acts of art vandalism are charged as one of two crimes 
that prohibit physical harm to another’s property: criminal mischief and 
library offenses. This section introduces and evaluates these two property 
crimes and seeks to determine to what extent they apply to and have the 
capacity to control art vandalism as the previous section has defined the 
crime. While neither law currently provides adequate protection against 
art vandalism, to varying degrees they both provide a basis for effective 
control of the crime. Fundamentally, both criminal mischief and library 
offenses establish that willful damage to a work of art warrants criminal 
sanctions. In addition, in some states these laws specifically recognize 
and protect the public interest and cultural value that is embodied in 
property such as art. Therefore, notwithstanding their shortcomings, 
criminal mischief and library offenses have the potential to address art 
vandalism. Assessing the laws’ strengths and weaknesses points to how 
they may be amended to more effectively apprehend and control art 
vandalism. 
A. Criminal Mischief  
Intentional property damage, or vandalism, is an illegal act. In 
the United States, the federal government and every state has 
criminalized vandalism in statutes that prohibit physical injury to another 
person’s tangible property when done without a legal right.138 These 
statutes defend ownership interests in real and personal property.139 By 
deterring and punishing injury to the physical integrity and financial 
value of another’s property, these statutes, like property law generally, 
seek to protect and stabilize the property regime.140 State codes most 
often call the offense criminal mischief,141 and the following elements are 
common to all criminal mischief statutes: (1) injury to tangible property 
  
 
138
 See Victoria L. Lutz & Cara M. Bonomolo, My Husband Just Trashed Our Home: 
What Do You Mean That’s Not a Crime?, 48 S.C.L. REV. 641, 641 n.2 (1997) (listing all state 
statutes); see also DAVID T. SKELTON, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW 111 (1998) (noting that 
vandalism is the commonly used term for the crime).  
 
139
 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal Mischief or Damage to Property § 1 (2005); John M. 
Leventhal, Spousal Rights or Spousal Crimes, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 351, 361 (2006); see also 
ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 40 (1991). 
 
140
 See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1095, 1098 (2007) (observing that the “criminal enforcement of existing property entitlements” 
supports stability, which is a “key purpose of property law”) (citing Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 552 (2005)). 
 
141
 This Note uses criminal mischief as the generic term for the crime. The federal statute 
and several state codes employ different names for the crime. See Lutz & Bonomolo, supra note 
138, at 641 n.2 (citations omitted). 
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(2) belonging to another person (3) committed with a culpable mental 
state.142  
Criminal mischief statutes derive from malicious mischief, a 
common law offense, in which ill-will towards property owners 
combined with the intent to harm their property.143 Today, the federal 
government and nearly all states have abandoned “evil motive” 
culpability for the crime and require only a purposeful or reckless mental 
state.144 Whereas the original common law crime called for capital 
punishment,145 all states and the federal government classify criminal 
mischief as a misdemeanor.146 This comports with the contemporary 
perception of vandalism as a minor “nuisance crime” that causes minimal 
harm and warrants few arrests.147 Aggravating factors, however, can 
heighten the crime’s severity and increase its classification from a 
misdemeanor to a felony.148  
Art vandalism, as unauthorized and intentional physical injury to 
works of art, is prosecuted as criminal mischief.149 Criminal mischief 
statutes, however, as currently formulated, do not fully recognize the 
harm art vandalism causes. This Note thus argues that unless amended 
these statutes cannot adequately control nor punish attacks on publicly 
valued works of art. To reach this assessment, two statutory features of 
criminal mischief are particularly important to consider: what valuation 
enhances the crime’s severity and what types of property receive special 
forms of protection.  
  
 
142
 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal Mischief or Damage to Property § 4 (2007); Lutz & 
Bonomolo, supra note 138, at 641, 644. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.10 (McKinney 2009) 
(stating, in pertinent part, “[a] person is guilty of criminal mischief . . . when, with intent to damage 
property of another person, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he 
has such right, he damages property of another person”). 
 
143
 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal Mischief or Damage to Property § 1 (2005); Martin 
R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past 
and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 713-14 (1993). 
 
144
 See, e.g., State v. Cannady, 196 S.E.2d 617, 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973), aff’d 205 S.E. 
2d 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (interpreting the state’s statutory prohibition of “willful and wanton 
injury to personal property,” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-160 (2006), as enacted “to avoid the element of 
malicious ill will required by the commonlaw [sic] crime of malicious mischief”); see also Gardner, 
supra note 143, at 716. 
 
145
 Gardner, supra note 143, at 713. 
 
146
 North Carolina courts have stated that removing the mental state of malice justifies 
reducing the crime from a felony to a misdemeanor. Cannady, 196 S.E.2d at 619. See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 14-127, 14-160(a) (2006). 
 
147
 JOHN H. LINDQUIST, MISDEMEANOR CRIME: TRIVIAL CRIMINAL PURSUIT 103 (1988). 
 
148
 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1604 (2001) (classifying as a felony the “aggravated 
criminal damage” to a place of worship, school, or cemetery). Generally, felonies carry sentences 
over one year in prison, whereas misdemeanors carry sentences of one year or less. SKELTON, supra 
note 138, at 18. 
 
149
 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 1 (reporting that the vandal who spray painted the 
words “Kill Lies All” on Picasso’s painting was charged with criminal mischief); Vogel, supra note 
4, at 1C (reporting that the museum guard who vandalized the Pop Art painting was charged with 
criminal mischief by the Manhattan District Attorney’s office); Metro News Briefs: New York, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, at 41 (reporting that the vandal who attacked the Virgin Mary painting was 
charged with criminal mischief). In some states, art vandalism can be charged as a different criminal 
offense. See infra Part II.B. 
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States most commonly assess the severity of criminal mischief in 
financial terms.150 The majority of statutes, including the federal law, 
grade criminal mischief according to the monetary loss that results from 
the intentional damage to the property.151 Generally, states assign the 
highest sentences for damage amounts between $1000 and $5000.152 The 
associated maximum prison sentences range between five and ten 
years.153 As the outlier, Texas grades criminal mischief as a first-degree 
  
 
150
 52 AM. JUR. 2d Malicious Mischief § 1 (2000). Other aggravating factors can also 
enhance the crime’s severity. Many states impose higher sentences when damage to property 
endangers human life or the property is damaged by dangerous means. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 
16-7-22 (2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW §145.12 (McKinney 2009); see also Carthern v. State, 529 S.E.2d 
617, 620 (Ga. 2000) (interpreting criminal damage in the first degree to refer to “reckless 
endangerment” and recognizing the “heightened punishment for criminal damage to property when 
human safety is threatened”). States also frequently enhance the punishment when the vandalism 
causes substantial impairment to a public utility. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-106 (2003); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.01 (West 2005). The culpable mental state can also reclassify the crime as a 
felony. For example, New York grades as misdemeanors a reckless act that causes damage above 
$250, or an intentional act that causes less than $250 damage to another’s property. N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 145.00 (McKinney 2009). Intentional acts of criminal mischief, however, that cause damage 
above $250 are graded as felonies. N.Y. PENAL LAWS §§ 145.05, 145.10 (McKinney 2009); see also 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 127 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-05 (1997) (grading pecuniary 
loss above $2000 as a misdemeanor if caused recklessly and as a felony if caused intentionally). But 
see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 805, 806 (2006) (making no distinction between 
damage caused “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly”). 
 
151
 For instance, willful damage exceeding $1000 to United States government property is 
a felony and punishable up to ten years, whereas damage under $1000 is charged as a misdemeanor. 
18 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000). New York’s criminal mischief statute also distinguishes between 
misdemeanor and felony charges and escalates the charge in degrees according to the amount of 
damage caused. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00-.12 (McKinney 2009). North Carolina and Rhode 
Island are the only states that do not consider financial loss and that classify the crime as a 
misdemeanor under all circumstances. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-127 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
160(a) (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-1 (2002). But see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-148(c) (2006) 
(grading desecration or defacement of a grave site as a felony if the amount of damage is $1000 or 
greater and as a misdemeanor if less damage is caused). Some states grade the crime according to the 
property’s value rather than the loss incurred. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §22-303 (2001); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 266, § 127 (2000; see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 206.310 (LexisNexis 2006) 
(recognizing either “value of the property affected or the loss resulting from such offense” in 
assigning the appropriate sentence); Romero v. State, 996 P.2d 894, 897 (Nev. 2000) (clarifying that 
when property is destroyed, its fair market value is the appropriate measure, whereas when property 
is partially damaged, the cost of repair properly measures the amount of damage). The Model Penal 
Code, the American Legal Institute’s codification of criminal law, cautions that classifying the crime 
according to the property’s value risks over-grading the crime. MODEL PENAL CODE & 
COMMENTARIES § 220.3 cmt. 8 (1980) (“One who dents a fender by throwing rocks at a parked 
vehicle, for example, hardly presents a serious risk that the entire value of the car will be lost.”). For 
a brief history of the Model Penal Code and its impact, see Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of 
Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 947-53 (1999). To be clear, financial 
loss is not an element of the crime; it is relevant for sentencing purposes only. See supra note 142 
and accompanying text. A vandal, furthermore, need not intend to cause a specific amount of 
financial damage to be convicted of higher grade of criminal mischief. See State v. Paris, 627 A.2d 
582, 586 (N.H. 1993); Valdes v. State, 510 So.2d 631, 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that 
“the value of the property damage is relevant only to the severity of the crime”). 
 
152
 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:17-3(b)(1) (2008) (providing the highest grade for loss 
greater than $2000); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(b) (2000) (providing the highest grade for 
loss greater than $5000); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-137(B) (2004) (providing the highest grade for 
property valued or damaged at $1000 or more). 
 
153
 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7001 (2008) (authorizing sentences of one to five 
years for damage over $1000); ME. STAT. REV. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 805, 1252(2)(C) (2007) 
(authorizing a maximum sentence of five years for damage over $2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
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felony if pecuniary loss is greater than $200,000,154 which can lead to 
imprisonment for life or for a term of five to ninety-nine years.155 Four 
states recognize damage over $100,000,156 which authorizes prison 
sentences ranging from one to fifteen years.157 At the opposite extreme, 
two states assign the highest sentences of up to three or five years158 for 
damage at or above $500.159 
In addition to punishing vandalism according to diverse damage 
thresholds, states also measure property damage differently.160 Some 
jurisdictions measure damage strictly by the cost of repair.161 Other states 
allow the diminution of the property’s value or the cost of repair to 
determine the crime’s severity.162 When there is a choice of calculation, 
or the means of measurement are not defined, reasonableness determines 
which calculation of economic loss is most appropriate under the given 
circumstances.163 
As currently formulated, criminal mischief statutes risk 
underestimating and undercriminalizing art vandalism. If value is not 
  
634:2, 651:2 (2007) (authorizing a maximum sentence of seven years for damage over $1000); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-510 (2003) (authorizing a maximum sentence of ten years for damage at or 
above $5000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-30 (LexisNexis 2005) (authorizing a maximum sentence 
of ten years for damage at or above $2500); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-201 (2007) (authorizing a 
maximum sentence of ten years for damage at or above $1000); see also 54 C.J.S. Malicious or 
Criminal Mischief or Damage to Property § 17 (2005) (stating that “[g]eneral rules governing 
sentencing and punishment in criminal prosecutions” apply to convictions of criminal mischief 
including the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors).  
 
154
 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03(b)(7) (Vernon 2008). 
 
155
 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32 (Vernon 2003). 
 
156
 ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.475(a)(3) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-1 (LexisNexis 
2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.05(E) (LexisNexis 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-34-1 
(2006). 
 
157
 ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(c)(1) (2007) (providing a sentence of five to eight years for 
a class A felony that is a first felony offense committed without aggravating factors); 730 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/5-8-1(4) (LexisNexis 2007) (providing a sentence of four to fifteen years for a class one 
felony); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.14(A)(3) (LexisNexis 2008) (providing a sentence of one to 
five years for a felony of the third degree); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1(6) (2006) (providing a 
maximum sentence of fifteen years for a class three felony). 
 
158
 Maryland permits imprisonment for up to three years, while Mississippi authorizes 
maximum jail terms of five years. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-301(b) (LexisNexis 2002); 
MISS. CODE ANN. §97-17-67(3) (2007).  
 
159
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-301(b) (LexisNexis 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. §97-
17-67(3) (2007).  
 
160
 54 C.J.S. Malicious or Criminal Mischief or Damage to Property § 10 (2007) (citing 
State v. Hughes, 946 P.2d 1338, 1342-43 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997)). 
 
161
 Id.; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.06 (Vernon 2003) (“The amount of 
pecuniary loss . . . if the property is damaged, is the cost of repairing or restoring the damaged 
property . . . .”); People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890, 895 (Colo. 1983) (“In cases of partial damage, 
the appropriate measure of economic loss will generally be the reasonable cost of repair or 
restoration.”). Dunoyair affirmed a jury conviction for intentional damage to a painting hung in a 
university campus restaurant. Id. at 891-92. The court considered the painting’s market value in 
order to determine whether the restoration costs were less than the painting’s actual value and thus 
permissible. Id. at 894-95.  
 
162
 See, e.g., Hughes, 946 P.2d at 1343.  
 
163
 See, e.g., State v. Brockell, 928 P.2d 650, 651-53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a 
criminal mischief statute that grades the crime according to economic loss is not constitutionally 
void for vagueness because it does not specify how to measure the amount of damage caused).  
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appropriately accounted for or measured, the crime goes underpenalized.164 
First, the grading thresholds do not account for the economic value of the 
museum-owned artworks targeted for attack.165 The market value of 
works of art in museum collections can range from the hundreds of 
thousands to hundreds of millions of dollars.166 If criminal mischief 
penalties are meant to be proportional to the amount of damage caused,167 
then proportional penalties do not currently exist for works of art in 
museum collections. Second, in cases of damage to a work of art, neither 
the cost of repair nor diminution in value alone may properly measure 
loss. Unlike an automobile or a building, artworks tend not to be 
composed of separable manufactured parts.168 If one part of a painting is 
damaged, the integrity and value of the entire work can be diminished.169 
Even when restored, an artwork often cannot be returned to its prior 
condition.170 Accordingly, in many cases restoration costs and lost market 
value together more accurately determine the financial loss caused by 
vandalism to a work of art.171 Third, measuring the crime’s severity 
according to the art owner’s financial loss neglects to recognize or 
punish detriment to the collective cultural value embodied in works of 
art. As a result, criminal mischief statutes currently fail to account for the 
  
 
164
 Romero v. State, 996 P.2d 894, 897 (Nev. 2000) (“The overall intent of [criminal 
mischief] statutes is to make criminal penalties proportionate to the value of the property affected.”). 
 
165
 Art vandals often target the most valuable works of art. See, e.g., FREEDBERG, supra 
note 10, at 15 (“‘But why did you choose the Nightwatch?’ ‘Because it seemed to me to be the most 
expensive possession of the State . . . .’” (quoting an interview with the attacker of a Rembrandt 
masterpiece)) (citation omitted); Talley, Rembrandt, supra note 79, at 86 (explaining that the vandal 
entered the museum seeking “to destroy something of extraordinary value” and asked an attendant to 
point out the museum’s most important painting).  
 
166
 Interview with senior underwriter of a leading fine arts insurance company (Jan. 15, 
2008). 
 
167
 See supra note 164. 
 
168
 The authors of the Model Penal Code considered a car rather than a painting when 
they called it extravagant to assume vandalism risks “harm to the entire unit of property.” MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 220.3 cmt. 8 at 53 (1980).  
 
169
 See supra note 79. John Henry Merryman also identifies the intangible collective 
interest in preserving an artwork’s integrity as arising from the importance of seeing “the work as the 
artist intended it, undistorted and ‘unimproved’ by the unilateral actions of others.” Merryman, supra 
note 132, at 1041. 
 
170
 See supra note 79. The nature of the damage and the nature of the art object influence 
the restoration’s success. For instance, the conservator Caroline Keck has noted that when “ink has 
marred porous layers, compensation for . . . damage [by conservation] is seldom completely 
effective.” CAROLINE KECK, ON CONSERVATION 10 (1971). As another example, restoration to large 
monochromatic paintings, such as Barnett Newman’s work, “do[es] not easily conceal scars.” Vogel, 
supra note 71, at E1. A conservator further explained that the repair “‘can interfere with the overall 
painting, because there are no figural elements to mask it.’” Id. In some cases, full restoration is 
possible, such as when a varnished painting is defaced. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 1 (reporting 
no damage was caused to Picasso’s masterpiece because a thick coating of varnish “‘acted as an 
invisible shield’” between the painting and the vandal’s spray paint and that a solvent removed 
nearly all traces of the red paint, the remainder of which was scraped off). 
 
171
 For example, the St. Louis Art Museum, which owns the painting that was damaged 
when the museum guard wrote on it in ink (see supra note 4), spent $6500 to restore the painting. 
Museum Sues the Whitney Over a Disfigured Painting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at C16. The 
museum further sought $1.5 million in compensatory damages in a civil suit for loss to the painting’s 
value despite the effort to restore the ink stained canvas. Id.; see also supra note 170. 
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public loss incurred when works of art that the public values are 
intentionally attacked.172  In sum, when statutes do not properly account 
for the tangible and intangible value lost when an artwork is damaged or 
destroyed, they fall short of discouraging and properly punishing art 
vandalism.  
Some criminal mischief statutes, however, do consider intangible 
value and provide higher grades for vandalism of specific types of 
property. These examples are important to consider as to art vandalism 
because they show that state legislatures have chosen to account for 
certain properties’ public, symbolic, or historical value.173 In addition to 
general prohibitions of property damage, some states also specifically 
prohibit, for instance, harm to service animals,174 damage to schools,175 or 
desecration of cemeteries.176 Consequently, in some jurisdictions 
vandalism to a school or cemetery leads to a more severe sentence.177  
Most notably, New Hampshire amended its criminal mischief 
statute in 1996 with a provision that specifically protects unique objects 
of cultural value.178 Under the law, criminal mischief rises from a 
  
 
172
 See supra notes 7-11 and 169 and accompanying text. 
 
173
 See, e.g., 14 AM. JUR. 2d Cemeteries § 31 (2000) (“The sentiment of all civilized 
peoples regards the resting place of the dead as hallowed ground and requires that in some respects it 
be not treated as subject to the laws of ordinary property.”); see also People v. Rivera, 968 P.2d 
1061, 1068 (Colo. App. 1997) (noting that the “aggravating factor[] of the loss of the community’s 
school building, which had symbolic and historic value” properly contributed to sentencing of the 
crime). 
 
174
 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 600.5 (West Supp. 2008) (prohibiting injury or death to 
“any guide, signal, or service dog”); IND. CODE § 35-43-1-2(a)(B)(vi) (2004) (prohibiting damage to 
a “law enforcement animal”). California provides approximately forty other prohibited forms of 
conduct towards animals under malicious mischief. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 596-600.2 (West 1999).  
 
175
 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1604(2) (2001) (designating defacement or 
damage to a school or educational facility as aggravated criminal damage); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/21-1.2(a)(3) (2008) (designating damage to a “school, educational facility or community center” as 
institutional vandalism); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 206.125(1)(c) (Supp. 2007) (prohibiting damage 
to a “school, educational facility, . . . or community center”). 
 
176
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-23.1 (LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting injury or 
destruction of “any tomb, monument, gravestone or other memorial of the dead”); ALASKA STAT.§ 
11.46.482(3) (2007) (classifying the damage or desecration of a cemetery as third degree criminal 
mischief); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7027 (2004) (prohibiting desecration of a “grave, cemetery, 
headstone, grave marker, mausoleum, crypt, or other place of burial”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 
127A (West 2000) (prohibiting injury or destruction of a “building, structure or place used for the 
purpose of burial or memorializing the dead”); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.22-.23 (McKinney 2009) 
(classifying two degrees of desecration of “real or personal property maintained as a cemetery plot, 
grave, burial place or other place of interment of human remains”). 
 
177
 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 11.46.482(3) (2007) (classifying desecration of a cemetery 
as criminal mischief in the third degree and grading the crime as a class C felony); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1604(2) (2001) (classifying defacing or damaging a cemetery as aggravated criminal 
damage).  
 
178
 Criminal Mischief Definition Revised, ch. 225:2, 1996 N.H. Laws 349-50. The 
provision went into effect on January 1, 1997. Id. Three other states also provide specific protection 
for works of art in separate criminal mischief statutes. FLA. STAT. ANN. §806.14 (2007) (prohibiting 
willful damage to a work of art displayed in a state building); OKLA. STAT. §1785 (West 2002) 
(prohibiting malicious damage to works of literature or art in public institutions, such as libraries or 
museums); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-15 (2002) (prohibiting willful, malicious, or wanton damage to 
property belonging to or in the custody of libraries, museums, or archives). Like library offenses 
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misdemeanor to a felony when, inter alia, a person purposely or 
recklessly damages property he knows has “historical, cultural, or 
sentimental value that cannot be restored by repair or replacement.”179 No 
published case law is available to clarify the provision’s scope. A review 
of the provision’s language and legislative history, however, 
demonstrates that the law neither addresses nor adequately applies to art 
vandalism.  
As drafted, the provision requires a person know that the 
property he damages has cultural value that cannot be restored or 
replaced.180 The provision thus overlays a strict knowledge requirement 
not present in the statute’s other forms of felony criminal mischief.181 
Indeed, in many circumstances, proving that a person knew that the 
object he attacked “cannot be restored by repair or replacement” would 
be difficult to establish and easy to refute beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The legislative history clarifies that the provision aims to protect owners 
of personal property, such as photo albums and other sentimental 
mementos, from instances when such knowledge constitutes a malicious 
attack.182  
Thus intended and formulated, New Hampshire’s statutory 
provision for objects of cultural value does not effectively address art 
vandalism. First, given the frequent and well publicized restoration of 
vandalized artworks, a prosecutor would find it exceedingly difficult to 
meet this provision’s additional burden of proof.183 Second, the 
provision as formulated does not address the nature of art vandalism. 
While art vandals target objects of cultural value,184 there is no evidence 
  
discussed infra Part II.B., these laws do not provide adequate or exemplary protection against art 
vandalism. 
 
179
 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:2 (2007). As a class B felony, conviction can lead to 
imprisonment for up to seven years. Id. § 651:2 (2007).  
 
180
 Id. § 634:2(II)(a) (2007). See State v. Paris, 627 A.2d 582, 586 (N.H. 1993) (clarifying 
that a defendant need not act purposely with respect to the amount of pecuniary loss caused). 
 
181
 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:2(I) (2007). The other aggravating factors that 
enhance the crime to a felony are as follows: “(a) pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000; (b) A 
substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, transportation, supply of water, gas 
or power or other public service; or (c) Discharge of a firearm at an occupied structure . . . .” Id. at II. 
 
182
 See (New Title) Relative to Vandalism and Criminal Mischief: Hearing on H.B. 1291 
Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 1996 Leg., 1996 Sess. 5 (N.H. 1996) (statement of Representative 
Donna P. Sytek). Representative Sytek was the only official to address the portion of the bill 
amending the criminal mischief statute. Id. In support of the amendment, she stated: “A serious 
criminal mischief isn’t only when you destroy something valuable; it’s when you destroy something 
that might be irreplaceable. I’m thinking of wedding albums, Christmas ornaments that my daughter 
made maybe when she was five years old, if somebody knows that by destroying that . . . it should 
be a felony.” Id.  
 
183
 David Freedberg observes that media reports on art vandalism take “interest in 
restoration, in the awesome difficulties of repairing the work, of the almost magical success of 
making it appear as if the attack had never happened.” FREEDBERG, supra note 10, at 25 (citation 
omitted). Two examples are the detailed accounts of the restoration of the (London) National 
Gallery’s Leonardo da Vinci drawing that was damaged when shot at and Rembrandt’s Danaë that 
was damaged with knife slashes and acid. Boggan, supra note 3; Talley, Rembrandt, supra note 79, 
at 86. 
 
184
 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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that they seek out artworks that cannot be restored or replaced. Finally, 
the provision may protect only irreparable property from damage.185 It 
thus can deny protection to reparable works of art, as well as many other 
forms of salvageable property with historical, cultural, or sentimental 
value.   
In sum, while art vandalism squarely constitutes criminal 
mischief, criminal mischief statutes do not currently recognize the unique 
risks and harms of art vandalism. Extant laws neither account for nor set 
appropriate penalties for artworks’ significant financial and cultural 
value. Some states do protect property with public, cultural, and 
symbolic value. Nonetheless, no criminal mischief law, as currently 
formulated, effectively protects works of art from vandalistic attack 
arising from the shared cultural value the artworks embody and 
represent. 
B. Library Offenses  
There are certain criminal laws and other offenses that 
specifically seek to protect artworks belonging to museums and other 
public institutions. Six states prohibit intentional damage to property in 
the collections of libraries, galleries, museums, and other related 
educational institutions.186 These offenses are nearly identical to criminal 
mischief in that they prohibit damage to tangible property belonging to a 
library or other enumerated institution committed with a culpable mental 
state.187 Unlike criminal mischief, library offenses188 may also prohibit the 
  
 
185
 Not all publicly valued artworks are irreparable or irreplaceable. See supra note 75. 
 
186
 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 19910 (West 2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16B-2.1 
(2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202-A:24 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-398 (2006); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-13-330 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-803 (2003). Three other states have similar 
offenses yet limit protection exclusively to libraries. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, §§ 99, 100 
(2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.391 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.541 (2003). Ohio 
criminalizes as desecration purposely damaging “object[s] of reverence or sacred devotion” such as 
the United States or Ohio flag, a “work of art or museum piece,” and a “place of worship” and its 
property. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.11 (LexisNexis 2006). Ohio classifies desecration of a 
“work of art or museum piece” as a misdemeanor. Id. § 2927.11(A)(5), (B).  
 
187
 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 19910 (West 2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16B-2.1 
(2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202-A:24 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-398 (2006); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-13-330 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-803 (2003). New Hampshire does not define the 
protected property. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202-A:24 (1999). All other states provide illustrative 
lists, such as: “any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, newspaper, 
magazine, pamphlet, broadside, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microfilm, sound 
recording, audiovisual materials in any format, electronic data processing records, artifacts, or other 
documentary, written or printed materials regardless of physical form or characteristics.” UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-804 (2003). Most define a library as or list the institutions as “any gallery or 
museum or any state, public, school, college, or other institutional library.” E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 202-A:24 (2007).  
 
188
 This Note uses library offense as the generic term. States generally use descriptive 
titles such as “[m]alicious cutting, tearing, defacing, breaking, or injuring,” CAL. EDUC. CODE § 
19910 (West 2002), or “[t]heft or destruction of property of public libraries, museums, etc.,” N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-398 (2006). 
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property’s theft,189 and they additionally apply to persons who act under 
consent or another form of legal right.190 In these six jurisdictions, acts of 
art vandalism are properly prosecuted under these offenses.191 In North 
Carolina, for instance, a museum guard who purportedly damaged a 
museum toilet, the overflowing of which consequently damaged a 
museum art piece, was convicted under criminal mischief (for damage to 
the museum’s toilet) and under the library offense (for damage to the 
museum’s tapestry).192  
Generally, however, library offenses do not address the serious 
form of art vandalism discussed in this Note. Most states classify the 
offense as a misdemeanor regardless of the amount of damage caused.193 
With no or minimal grading structures, the offenses furthermore treat all 
library and museum property uniformly regardless of the economic 
value, rarity, or fragility of the object attacked.194 When compared with 
criminal mischief, the library offenses suggest that slashing a museum’s 
painting is a lesser crime than slashing a car’s tires.195 While these laws 
have the advantage of specifically recognizing the vulnerability of 
artworks in public institutions, the offenses provide weaker protection for 
artworks than the states’ criminal mischief laws.196 These offenses may 
function well as deterrents for minor forms of vandalism197 by making 
intentional damage to library or museum property a punishable 
offense.198 But if applied to serious acts of tactical and expressive art 
  
 
189
 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-398 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-330 (2003). Utah equates 
the offense with theft for sentencing purposes. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-412, 76-6-803 (2003). 
 
190
 Presumably, consent or justification operate as affirmative defenses. The one 
published case regarding this type of statute did not clarify this point of law. State v. Davis, 356 
S.E.2d 607 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). 
 
191
 Id. This is the only published case that addresses a library offense.  
 
192
 Id. at 609. The appellate court ultimately vacated the library offense conviction on the 
basis of insufficient evidence. Id. at 610.  
 
193
 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 19910 (West 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202-A:24 (1999); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-330 (2003). But see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16B-2.1 (2008); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-398 (2006) (grading the crime a Class H felony if damage exceeds $50 and 
otherwise as a misdemeanor). As a first offense, a Class H felony in North Carolina can carry a 
prison sentence of four to eight months. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17(c) (2006). Utah grades and 
sentences the offense as theft, which in that state mirrors the criminal mischief penalty structure. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-106, 76-6-412, 76-6-805 (2003).  
 
194
 Id. 
 
195
 This is accurate with the exception of North Carolina, where the damage to the 
painting could be charged as a felony, and Utah, where there would be no distinction in the severity 
of these acts. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-160, 14-398 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-106, 76-6-412 
(2003).  
 
196
 Compare, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:2 (2007) (classifying as felony criminal 
mischief purposely causing or attempting to cause damage when pecuniary loss is over $1000 or 
when the “actor knows that the property has historical, cultural, or sentimental value that cannot be 
restored by repair or replacement”) and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202-A:24 (1999) (classifying as a 
misdemeanor willful or malicious damage to any property in any library or museum).  
 
197
 See supra notes 50, 91, and 130 and accompanying text. 
 
198
 In 1959, New Hampshire State Senator Martin testified that while “[the library 
offense] law has rarely been used in a court case, . . . it has served as a useful deterrent.” An Act 
Relative to Damaging and Detaining Library and Gallery Property: Hearing on H.B. 127 Before the 
S. Comm. on Exec. Department, Municipal and County Government, 1959 Leg., 1959 Sess. 311 
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vandalism,199 in most instances these statutes would gravely 
underestimate and underpenalize the crime.200  
Because these offenses overlap with criminal mischief, they can 
furthermore lead to confusion and unpredictability in the prosecution of 
art vandalism.201  For example, if a person within New Hampshire’s 
jurisdiction intentionally and seriously damages an artwork in a museum, 
he could be charged with a felony under one of two different provisions 
in the general criminal mischief statute or with a misdemeanor under the 
library offense.202 Failure to prosecute under the library offense could 
lead to a dismissal, whereas failure to prosecute under criminal mischief 
could lead to a disproportionately light sentence.203 Consequently, the 
library offenses, which aim to control minor forms of vandalism, can 
impair the prosecution and confuse the legal apprehension of serious art 
vandalism.204  
As examples of duplicative and inconsistent laws, library 
offenses, in fact, have been singled out for criticism by commentators 
calling for reform to state criminal codes.205 These commentators argue 
  
(N.H. 1959). To encourage this deterrent effect, Massachusetts, where the statute applies only to 
libraries, requires libraries to prominently display posters summarizing and explaining the law. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 100 (2000). For an account of a library vandal undeterred by 
California’s law, see Richard Meyer, Slasher Story, ART JOURNAL, Spring 2005, at 32 (recounting 
that in nearly one year 607 books, most relating to homosexual history and culture, were seriously 
damaged by a single vandal and describing the exhibition the library organized in response to the 
attacks).  
 
199
 See supra Part I.C. 
 
200
 In the two states where the library offense is graded higher than or equal to criminal 
mischief, the offense still does not proportionally address the severity of art vandalism. In North 
Carolina, while violating the library offense is a Class H felony, the maximum sentence is eight 
months imprisonment. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-398, 15A-1340.17(c) (2006). This sentence is 
significantly lighter than penalties for criminal mischief in other states. See supra text accompanying 
notes 153-159. Utah grades the library offense and criminal mischief equally, and thus does not 
properly account for the greater magnitude of harm when a work of art is attacked. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 76-6-106(3), 76-6-412, 76-6-805 (2003); see supra notes 164-172 and accompanying text. 
 
201
 The authors of the Model Penal Code warned that “an unwary prosecutor who filed a 
charge under the general provision [of criminal mischief] based on conduct that was specifically 
prohibited elsewhere ran the risk of dismissal for charging the wrong offense.” MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 220.3 cmt. 1 at 41-42 (1980). Thus, the authors recommended consolidating all forms of criminal 
mischief into a single statute. Id. at 42. Accordingly, their concern applies when a state has a general 
criminal mischief statute and separate statutes that prohibit harm to particular types of property, such 
as library offenses. 
 
202
 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202-A:24, 634:2(II)(a), 634:2(II)(d) (2007) (assuming 
the vandalism causes over $1000 worth of damage). 
 
203
 See supra note 201. 
 
204
 See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of 
American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 637-45 (2005) (hereinafter Accelerating 
Degradation) (identifying the multiple problems that can arise from redundant offenses in a state’s 
compiled laws); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the 
States from Themselves?, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170-72 (2003) (hereinafter Model Penal Code 
Second) (arguing that library offenses, and other such “designer offenses,” “cause positive damage 
to the effective operation of the code”). 
 
205
 Robinson & Cahill, Accelerating Degradation, supra note 204, at 638; Robinson & 
Cahill, Model Penal Code Second, supra note 204, at 170; Melissa J. Mitchell, Cleaning Out the 
Closet: Using Sunset Provisions to Clean Up Cluttered Criminal Codes, 54 EMORY L.J. 1671, 1678 
(2005).  
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that duplicative laws, such as the library offenses, make it more difficult 
for citizens, law enforcement, and the courts to understand what conduct 
a state code prohibits.206 This confusion can lead to errors and disparate 
treatment.207 When offenses overlap, as library offenses do with criminal 
mischief statutes, punishment levels can become inconsistent and 
disproportionate.208 These laws thus create the risk that justice will be 
misapplied and that the law’s moral authority and deterrent effect will be 
undermined.209 Accordingly, library offenses, which seek to prohibit 
harm to artworks separately from the generic criminal mischief statutes, 
present neither a recommended nor workable statutory model for 
devising more effective control of art vandalism.  
While art vandalism is prosecuted under criminal mischief and 
as a library offense, neither law, as formulated in any jurisdiction, 
effectively and appropriately addresses the crime. Library offenses 
protect works of art in museums and other public benefit institutions.210 
They thus identify precisely the property at risk from art vandalism.211 
However, these offenses underpenalize the crime and misapprehend the 
value, financial and intangible, of museum artworks.212 As devised 
separately from criminal mischief, sometimes outside the criminal 
code,213 they create confusion and risk misapplication of the law.214 
Criminal mischief, as criminal codes’ primary vandalism law, more 
properly addresseses the crime. While the statutes concern property 
generally, they can also accommodate provisions that reach specific 
types of property crimes.215 Amending criminal mischief statutes with 
provisions like the library offenses, which delimit the property art 
vandalism harms and account for the nature of the crime and scope of its 
harms, will allow states to more effectively protect artworks at risk from 
intentional attack.  
  
 
206
 Robinson & Cahill, Accelerating Degradation, supra note 204, at 638. 
 
207
 Id. at 638-39. 
 
208
 Id. at 642-44. 
 
209
 Id. at 644. 
 
210
 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 
211
 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 
212
 See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text. 
 
213
 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 19910 (West 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202-A:24 
(1999) (located, respectively, in the states’ consolidated statutes under Education and under 
Libraries). 
 
214
 See supra notes 207-209 and accompanying text. 
 
215
 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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IV. PROPOSAL: AMEND CRIMINAL MISCHIEF STATUTES TO 
ADDRESS ART VANDALISM 
Multiple concerns justify amending criminal mischief statutes, 
even absent an accurate account of art vandalism’s prevalence.216 
Available scholarship and documentation sufficiently attest to the risks 
art vandalism presents.217 First, adverse consequences arise from 
inadequately controlling the crime: property owners incur financial 
loss;218 objects of recognized cultural value suffer damage or 
destruction;219 lasting damage or total loss of these artworks deprive 
property owners and the public of access to cultural heritage;220 the public 
risks exposure to disorder and physical danger;221 and museums bear 
indirect financial and reputational costs.222 Second, without specific 
recognition of and accounting for art vandalism in criminal mischief 
statutes, the crime risks being misapprehended by prosecutors and 
judges,223 disproportionately sentenced,224 and ineffectively 
discouraged.225 Finally, notwithstanding security measures, museums do 
not have the capacity to prevent the crime.226  
  
 
216
 See supra note 33 and accompanying text regarding the lack of study and scholarship 
on art vandalism.  
 
217
 See supra note 15; see also infra app. (listing instances of art vandalism in public 
institutions reported in the press from 1977-2007).  
 
218
 Museums typically carry all-risk insurance policies for their collections that cover loss 
due to damage or destruction. Interview with senior underwriter of a leading fine arts insurance 
company (Jan. 15, 2008). Insurance companies, however, spread these costs to other insured parties 
and onto the market. See Peter Z. Grossman et al., Uncertainty, Insurance and the Learned Hand 
Formula, 5 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 11 (2006), available at http://lpr.oxfordjournals.org/content/ 
vol5/issue1/index.dtl#ARTICLES. (“[I]nsurance markets are intended to spread the risks to 
insurance firms across a pool of insured—both potential victims and injurers—so that the average 
value of harm represents a real number that when translated into premia allows for both claim 
satisfaction and company profits.”). 
 
219
 See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. 
 
220
 See supra note 169. 
 
221
 See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text. 
 
222
 See supra notes 34, 72. 
 
223
 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 
224
 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 
225
 See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 
226
 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. In fulfilling their public benefit missions, 
museums inescapably place works of art at risk. See Jason Sickles & Olin Chism, Police Lack Leads 
in DMA Vandalism, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 19, 1998, at 31A (“You make a commitment to 
share the experience of the art. Inherent in that is that you may run some risks.” (quoting a prominent 
Dallas art collector’s reaction to the vandalism of three paintings at the Dallas Museum of Art) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The institutions must balance the risks of exposing artworks to 
harm with the benefits of making them accessible to the public. Id. (“From a curatorial point of view, 
our ultimate responsibility is to protect the art, yet we want to make the art-viewing experience as 
meaningful as possible to our audience.” (quoting the museum’s curator) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Museums are typically hesitant to adopt security measures that significantly interfere with 
their visitors’ experience and with the works of art on display. Id. (“We don’t put bulletproof glass in 
front of the paintings, and we don’t enclose every sculpture. We want people to experience texture 
and surface and volume and color in a manner that’s not impaired by an intervening element.” 
(quoting the museum’s curator) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kleiner, supra note 12 (“[W]e 
can build this place into a fortress, but that’s not what we want . . . . We think of the museum as an 
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If amended, criminal mischief statutes can address these risks. 
As previously discussed, the statutes currently fail to recognize the crime 
or properly measure its harm.227 Curing these deficiencies will enable the 
statutes to more effectively control art vandalism. Indeed, given the 
nature of the crime and the risks it presents, this Note’s proposal aims, 
above all, to discourage the crime.228 Accurately measuring art 
vandalism’s severity and clearly identifying the property it protects can 
further reinforce this deterrence goal, as well as promote normative 
values.229  
This Note thus suggests two mandates for a provision that would 
amend criminal mischief statutes.230 Criminal mischief laws have the 
advantage of being codified in every United States jurisdiction, 
criminalizing vandalistic conduct, employing grading structures, and 
enhancing penalties for both monetary and intangible losses.231 
Furthermore, in most jurisdictions, the statutes recognize and identify 
specific types of property that require special protection not provided in 
  
open public space, not Fort Knox.” (quoting a museum spokesman responding to a vandalistic attack 
at his institution) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Muchnic, supra note 79, at 6F (expressing that 
“the greatest tragedy is that bullet-proof glass will be put on more of the paintings” because it 
distorts the paintings (quoting an art conservator) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
  Notwithstanding museums’ misgivings about the effects of broader security measures, 
initiatives to increase public funding can improve security and protect against vandalism by, for 
example, increasing security staff. As evidence of this, reductions in security personnel following 
budget cuts led to greater instances of vandalism at the Smithsonian museums. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1127, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION: FUNDING CHALLENGES 
AFFECT FACILITIES’ CONDITION AND SECURITY, ENDANGERING COLLECTIONS 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071127.pdf (“Some of the Smithsonian’s museum and facility 
directors said that in the absence of more security officers, some cases of vandalism and theft have 
occurred.”); Jason Edward Kaufman, Smithsonian Adopts Sweeping Reforms, THE ART NEWSPAPER, 
Feb. 2, 2008, available at http://www.arteconomy24.ilsole24ore.com/news/news.php?id=203 (“And 
museum directors report increased vandalism due to reductions in security staff—at the 
[Smithsonian] American Art Museum, works have been written on, spat on and kissed.”). 
 
227
 See supra Part III.A.  
 
228
 A discussion of deterrence and criminal law theory is beyond the scope of this Note. In 
simple terms, deterrence is a utilitarian theory that assumes that people make rational choices and 
that criminal sentences therefore can be designed to disincentivize others from committing a similar 
offense. Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Aims, Principles, and Policies, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 333, 336 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999). One of the many criticisms of deterrence 
theory is the blunt and potentially unjust punishment of individuals with sentences meant to deter 
others. Id. at 337-38. The principle of desert when combined with deterrence objectives may 
“preserve elements of deterrence theory while avoiding the principled objections.” Id. at 338. This 
Note’s argument is informed by this hybrid. Paul H. Robinson and Michael T. Cahill succinctly 
articulate it as follows: “[A] system based purely on desert will also tend to achieve [deterrence’s] 
crime-control objective, because the prospect of ex post deserved punishment for those who commit 
crimes provides a good ex ante incentive not to commit them. In short, desert deters.” PAUL H. 
ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE 118 (2006).  
 
229
 See supra note 228 and infra note 252. 
 
230
 This Note’s proposal assumes a criminal mischief statute structured as a single general 
offense to which a provision may be amended. The proposal can also be adopted by states that 
organize their criminal mischief statutes into an integrated series of offenses or retain the “old 
approach” of prohibiting numerous specific harms supplemented by a “catch-all offense.” MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 220.3 cmt. 1 at 41-42 (1980). States without a single statute should exercise care to 
maintain uniformity in grading, culpability, and other definitions to avoid the problems raised by 
Paul H. Robinson and Michael T. Cahill. See supra notes 206-209 and accompanying text. 
 
231
 See supra Part II.A. 
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the general offense.232 Thus, the statutes can accommodate this Note’s 
suggestions and through them, it is argued, affect needed improvements 
to control art vandalism.  
A. Identify the Property 
To address art vandalism, the provision must identify the 
property entitled to its enhanced protection: works of art that embody 
public value. Determining “what is art?” may ultimately be 
unanswerable233 and courts have long avoided the question.234 Courts 
have additionally struggled to ascertain which works of art hold public 
value.235 Thus, the provision requires clear statutory definition of which 
artworks fall within its protection. Clearly delimiting the protected 
property will aid judges, enable enforcement, and provide effective 
notice.236 This proposal looks to the library offenses discussed above for 
a practical and appropriate solution.237  
The library offenses expressly delimit protection for objects at 
risk in public institutions, such as libraries, museums, archives, and 
governmental agencies, by defining the institution as a stand-in for a 
definition of the protected objects.238 This approach can be adapted to a 
  
 
232
 See, e.g., supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text. 
 
233
 See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 808 (2005) (“The 
‘What is Art?’ debate has raged for centuries without resolution.”). 
 
234
 Id. at 811-15. “[O]ne of the most stable and explicitly stated doctrines across art law is 
termed here ‘the doctrine of avoidance’ of artistic determinations.” Id. at 815.  
 
235
 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1999) (ruling on 
what evidence and test may be used to determine whether a work of art is of “recognized stature” 
under the federal Visual Artists Rights Act). The “recognized stature” standard, not defined by the 
Visual Artists Rights Act, limits protection against destruction “to those works of art that art experts, 
the art community, or society in general views as possessing stature.” Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 
861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1208 (1996). The standard has been widely criticized by commentators as 
impractical and imprecise. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: 
Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Protection Act of 1990, 14 
COLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 477, 480 n.19 (1990) (calling the standard “incoherent”); Rebecca J. 
Morton, Carter v. Hemsley-Spear, Inc.: A Fair Test of the Visual Artists Rights Act?, 28 CONN. L. 
REV. 877, 914 (1996) (concluding that the standard is “unworkable,” too subjective, and leaves “the 
court embroiled in critical disputes between art experts”); Robinson, supra note 14, at 1969 (noting 
evidentiary problems and the problems with the “battle of the experts” the standard initiates at trial). 
 
236
 As to the benefits of clarity and notice, see ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 228, at 
89-90 (stating that clarity promotes “fair notice of the criminal law’s commands,” which provides 
basis for deterring the prohibited conduct and reinforces legislative authority over judicial discretion 
in lawmaking). 
 
237
 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.  
 
238
 Id. The offenses offer three different formulations to associate the property with the 
institutions: “belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of” or “deposited in” or 
“belonging to or in the care of.” Legislatures might also consider the language in the federal statute 
criminalizing theft of “major artwork[s],” which, by definition, are displayed in museums. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 668(a)(1) (2000) (defining a museum as an institution organized for an educational or aesthetic 
purpose with a professional staff that uses and cares for “tangible objects” which are regularly 
exhibited). Unlike this Note’s proposal, the federal statute defines which conditions, in addition to 
ownership or display in a museum, must be met for objects to be considered “major artworks” and 
thus entitled to protection. § 668(a)(2). Most library offenses also list the types of objects intended 
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provision specific to art vandalism by limiting the enumerated 
institutions to those targeted by art vandals.239 A broadly conceived 
adaptation may be: “Any work of art belonging to, displayed by, or 
otherwise in the custody of an institution organized on a permanent basis 
in whole or in part for educational purposes that exhibits works of art to 
the public on a regular basis.”240 This definition offers clarity, precision, 
and flexibility.241 First, it eliminates the need to define the objects 
deserving protection and instead defines the institutions that by 
exhibiting works of art confer public value on them.242 Furthermore, as a 
definition of publicly valued artwork, this formulation relies on and 
ratifies the expertise of the institutions’ professional staffs and thus 
avoids the need for courts to make aesthetic judgments. 
This proposal suggests amending criminal mischief statutes to 
designate specific protection for artworks displayed by museums. By 
clearly identifying the protected property, the statutes will more 
effectively address art vandalism. Furthermore, they will promote the 
statute’s enforcement by providing prosecutors and courts with a clear 
definition and mandate. By such notice of legislative intent and 
normative commitment, the provision will reduce misapprehension of the 
crime.243 Moreover, by recognizing art vandalism, providing specific 
protection for museums and their exhibits, and promising greater 
enforcement, the provision can encourage museums to more accurately 
report serious instances of the crime.  
B. Proportionally Grade and Penalize  
The provision will further promote deterrence by properly 
grading and penalizing the crime. Criminal mischief statutes generally 
  
for protection, see supra note 187, but have the advantage, in the author’s opinion, of avoiding the 
distinction between “major” and protectable artworks and “lesser” and unprotectable artworks. 
 
239
 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 
240
 See supra note 27. States may choose to narrow the definition explicitly to museums. 
As formulated, the definition also applies to public works of art installed under the auspices of a not-
for-profit art institution. To further clarify this purpose, the words “commissioned by” may also be 
added.  
  Although this Note discusses only art vandalism in museums, the vandalism of public 
art is a closely related issue. See supra note 28. Artworks are indeed vandalized outside the museum 
context, such as in public spaces and in private homes. See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 287-92. 
Adoption of the “recognized stature” standard—notwithstanding its limitations, see supra note 
235—can extend protection against vandalism to publicly valued artworks not owned or exhibited in 
museums. Legislatures could also consider adopting language, as does the federal art theft statute, 
that defines “objects of cultural heritage” according to their financial value or their value in 
combination with their age. 18 U.S.C. § 668(a)(2) (2006) (limiting protection to objects worth at 
least $100,000 or, if over 100 years old, worth at least $5,000). Once a legislature determines that 
destruction of an artwork of public value warrants legal recognition for the harm to both property 
and collective interests, extending this protection beyond institutional walls would only be logical. 
 
241
 As to the proposed definition’s flexibility, see supra note 240.  
 
242
 See supra notes 118-119, 124 and accompanying text.  
 
243
 See supra note 236. For examples of judicial misapprehension of art vandalism, see 
supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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grade the crime’s severity and assign sentences according to financial 
loss,244 which is measured by either the cost of damage or diminution in 
the property’s value.245 Three changes to the grading process will lead to 
more proportional punishment of art vandalism. First, to accurately 
account for the damage caused to a work of art, the valuation must 
combine restoration costs with the loss of market value.246 Accordingly, a 
provision that amends a criminal mischief statute to address art 
vandalism must specify that applying both forms of valuation is 
appropriate when measuring damage to a work of art.247 Second, the 
provision must also account for the non-monetary losses exacted by art 
vandalism.248 To do so, the provision can enhance the crime’s severity by 
one degree regardless of the amount of pecuniary loss.249 The final and 
most drastic recommendation is for states to either revise their grading 
structures or create a new category of “grand criminal mischief.” 
Currently, most states’ criminal mischief statutes do not recognize loss 
above $5000.250 Given the high market value of museum artworks, 
damage caused by art vandalism will far surpass most states’ highest 
grading level, especially in light of the two previous recommendations.251   
To address art vandalism and discourage the crime, criminal 
mischief statutes should be amended with a provision that reflects these 
recommendations. Without these changes, the severity of art vandalism, 
as existing statutes measure it, goes unaccounted for, which impairs the 
law’s deterrent effect.252 For example, spray painting a Picasso 
masterpiece affords a vandal far more notoriety and risks a loss of far 
greater magnitude than if the vandal instead spray painted a wall.253 An 
  
 
244
 See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text. 
 
245
 See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text. 
 
246
 See supra notes 168-171 and accompanying text. 
 
247
 It is assumed that the valuation will be governed by reasonableness and that this 
valuation will be applied when appropriate. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 
248
 See supra notes 7-11, 169 & 172 and accompanying text.  
 
249
 Some criminal mischief statutes employ a similar mechanism for the protection of 
different types of property. See, e.g., supra note 177. 
 
250
 See supra text accompanying note 152. 
 
251
 See supra text accompanying note 166 and supra note 171. For instance, the museum 
guard’s permanent defacement of the Pop Art painting (see supra note 4 and accompanying text) 
reportedly depreciated the painting’s value by $1.5 million. See supra note 171. Yet the crime could 
be graded only as if the damage had merely exceeded $1500. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.10 
(McKinney 2009). Whereas the sentence of up to seven years imprisonment for this charge might be 
considered harsh, this is the same punishment contemplated for vandalism to property without public 
value. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2)(d), 145.10 (McKinney 2009). Ultimately, the guard pled 
guilty to a lesser charge and was sentenced to three years probation. See supra note 22. For a 
discussion of plea bargaining in respect to desert, see ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 228, 
at 80-82. 
  
252
 John E. Conklin goes further to say that “lenient treatment that fails to recognize the 
sociocultural significance of art will not deter vandals and may actually encourage acts of 
destruction by communicating to the general population that art vandalism is a trivial offense.” 
CONKLIN, supra note 9, at 276.  
 
253
 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Professor Ann Althouse mentioned this 
example in conversation with the author to highlight the difference in symbolic meaning between 
writing on a wall and writing on a painting. 
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attack on an artwork should accordingly carry greater penal 
consequences.254 This is especially true because some art vandals 
consider the crime’s relatively light penalty when planning their 
attacks.255 As discussed, tactical and expressive art vandals make a series 
of choices in planning and committing their crimes.256 They seek 
publicity and a forum for their message.257 Art vandals make deliberate 
choices and the risk of appropriate and proportional sentences can make 
attacking an artwork a less palatable strategy. In sum, the suggested 
amendments to criminal mischief statutes, while modest for a property 
crime of such magnitude, can establish legal recognition of art vandalism 
that will guide enforcement, discourage the crime by applying just 
penalties, and encourage more reporting of its occurrence. 
V. CONCLUSION  
The modesty of this proposal is dictated by the lack of 
information currently available about art vandalism. The proposal 
represents the minimum states should do to protect publicly valued 
works of art. As more becomes known about art vandalism, states might 
determine that greater control is warranted and develop measures to 
encourage prevention and, when necessary, greater enforcement of the 
crime.258 The result of more study of art vandalism might also justify a 
  
 
254
 In this instance, the painting was easily restored and suffered no permanent damage, 
therefore the crime could have been charged at the same degree as defacing a wall. See Kaufman, 
supra note 1.  
 
255
 See GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 198-99 (recounting that a man who nearly destroyed a 
Rubens painting with acid “had envisaged . . . attracting attention to his ideas, such as committing 
suicide or colouring the Bodensee [River], before he had arrived at the idea of destroying ‘some 
famous picture’ and verified that it could not cost him more than three years of jail”); see also 
Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Aims, Principles, and Policies, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 
333, 336 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999) (noting that deterrent theory assumes “rational beings, who will 
adjust their conduct according to the disincentives provided by sentencing law” and that research has 
suggested that “general deterrence is more likely to be effective for planned . . . than for impulsive 
crimes”). On a historical note, the judge who sentenced the suffragette Mary Richardson (see supra 
text accompanying note 95) commented that her “sentence [was] thoroughly inadequate for such a 
crime” and due to a “‘queer anomaly of English law’” had she smashed a window instead of a major 
work of art the penalty could have been three times as severe. GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 96; Fine & 
Shatin, supra note 9, at 146 (citations omitted). 
 
256
 See supra notes 117-126 and accompanying text. 
 
257
 See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. Encouraging productive speech and 
discouraging acts that destroy speech also comports with the First Amendment’s utilitarian 
principles. See Strahilevitz, supra note 68, at 827-28 (“Tearing down or obliterating a statue sends a 
powerful message that the destroyer disagrees with the symbolic expression manifested in the work. 
But the destructive act is unlikely to contribute to a healthy public discourse . . . If the First 
Amendment is about the nation’s commitment to producing a public debate that is ‘uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open,’ then the law might well view the symbolic destruction of irreplaceable 
property as low-value speech that can be restricted in order to facilitate the success of a deliberative 
process.”) (citations omitted). 
 
258
 For instance, the art historian Dario Gamboni believes that education is needed to 
address art vandalism: “What is needed . . . is more information, education and enlightenment about 
art. That is the only way to overcome incomprehension and diminish the ‘aggressive potential’ of art 
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uniform federal solution to protect the national interest in works of art 
that embody public value regardless of the jurisdiction.259  
Notwithstanding its proposal, this Note has the additional 
purpose of prompting more awareness and study of art vandalism. The 
legal field, including art law, has been curiously silent on the subject.260 
Other fields have shown the rich philosophical, historical, sociological, 
and psychological meanings at play in intentional attacks on works of 
art.261 Study of the behavior illuminates the nature of art’s status in 
society and of people’s encounters with art.262 These insights aside, art 
vandalism is not merely theoretical. It is a property crime that threatens 
and often ruins objects society chooses to cherish. Law, as the arbiter of 
relational rights and duties, has much to say and do about such violence 
against art.  
Without more study, much will remain unknown about art 
vandalism. Without changes to laws, the crime will remain undeterred. 
Financially motivated art crimes, such as theft and fraud, are more 
pervasive than vandalism and accordingly demand greater attention and 
concern.263 When art vandalism occurs, however, its consequences can be 
far more devastating than misappropriation or misrepresentation because 
the effects of physical attacks are often irreversible. In the absence of 
effective laws, museums alone bear responsibility for both preventing 
and controlling vandalistic attacks on artworks they exhibit. It is no 
wonder, then, that museums underreport vandalism’s occurrence, deflect 
responsibility for it, and downplay vulnerability to the serious attacks.264  
While museum security can be bolstered by public funding,265 museums 
and other caretakers of cultural property cannot prevent art vandalism. 
  
that many people feel and to which they react with ‘counter-aggression’ by attacking or destroying 
the art.” Dornberg, supra note 33, at 108-09 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
259
 Some commentators have proposed establishing a national registry of significant 
works of art as a means for their protection. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 14, at 1971-75; Wilkes, 
supra note 13, at 177, 205-09. 
 
260
 None of the major art law reference books discuss art vandalism. See supra note 15. 
 
261
 See supra note 15. 
 
262
 The art historian Dario Gamboni observes that “research into the causes and 
motivations of art vandalism . . . raise[] profound questions about art itself, about what art is, what it 
purports to be, and the complex relationships linking artists, their work and the public.” Dornberg, 
supra note 33, at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
263
 Interview with senior underwriter of leading fine arts insurance company (Jan. 15, 
2008). Theft and fraud, unlike vandalism, are thoroughly addressed by the major art law reference 
books. See generally DARRABY, supra note 15; LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 15; MERRYMAN ET 
AL., supra note 15. 
 
264
 Traditionally, cultural institutions have also downplayed the theft of objects from their 
collections. Steve Twomey, To Catch a Thief, SMITHSONIAN, Apr. 2008, at 88, 90 (“Traditionally, 
the custodians of heritage have been leery of making too much fuss over thefts. After all, the filching 
of a historical treasure from a restricted and guarded room is embarrassing, and an admission of 
breached security could hurt funding or discourage potential donors from bequeathing their prized 
collections.”). “But a string of recent high-value crimes has led” some institutions “to greater 
frankness about the threat” and keeping quiet about the crime, has been characterized as “‘sleeping 
with the enemy.’” Id. 
 
265
 See supra note 226.  
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Their institutional missions require that they benefit the public with 
access to art, and this benefit undeniably puts artworks at risk. In the 
calculus of this risk to culturally significant works of art, law can and 
should lessen the odds.  
M.J. Williams† 
  
 †
  J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2009; A.B., University of Michigan, 1986. The 
author wishes to thank Professors Ann Althouse, Michael T. Cahill, Beryl R. Jones-Woodin, Minor 
Myers, and Robert M. Pitler for their helpful advice, comments, and encouragement. She also is 
thankful for the dedication and camaraderie of the Brooklyn Law Review’s editors and staff, in 
particular Shawn Thomas. Finally, the author is ever grateful for her family’s patience, love, and 
support.  
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APPENDIX:  PRESS REPORTS OF VANDALIZED ARTWORKS IN PUBLIC ART 
INSTITUTIONS, 1977-2007266 
1977  Twenty-three paintings (including three paintings 
by Rembrandt Van Rijn, and paintings by Peter 
Paul Rubens, Cranach, Paul Klee, and Thomas 
Herbst); art institutions in seven German cities; 
damaged with sulfuric acid.267 
 Untitled (1966-74), Jo Baer; Oxford Museum of 
Modern Art, Oxford, England; damaged with 
lipstick.268 
1978 The Adoration of the Golden Calf (1635), Nicolas 
Poussin; National Gallery, London, England; 
damaged from knife slashes and torn by hand.269 
 Self-Portrait with a Grey Hat (1887), Vincent van 
Gogh; Van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam, Holland; 
damaged from knife slashes.270 
1979 The Potato Eaters (1885), Vincent van Gogh; Van 
Gogh Museum, Amsterdam, Holland; damaged 
from eight-inch scratch from a key.271 
1981 Diana, Princess of Wales (1981), Bryan Organ; 
National Portrait Gallery, London, England; 
damaged from knife slashes.272 
  
 
266
 This list is by no means complete. It includes only those incidents reported in 
newspapers and magazines, as noted. See also Cordess & Turcan, supra note 7, at 101 (supplying an 
appendix without citations of “Well-Known Art Works Attacked, with Location and Year of 
Attack,” which includes five incidents between 1977 and 1991 that are not included in this 
Appendix). 
 
267
 Dornberg, supra note 33, at 103 (stating incorrect date of attack); 3 Durer 
Masterpieces Vandalized with Acid, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1988, at C28.  
 
268
 GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 192 (discussing vandalism to painting); E-mail from Jo 
Baer to author (Aug. 30, 2008, 08:48 GMT) (on file with author) (providing painting’s title and 
year). 
 
269
 Poussin Painting Slashed in Gallery, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 4, 1978, at 12. 
 
270
 Dutch Artist Slashes Van Gogh Painting (World News Briefs), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 
1978, at A7. The painting is in the collection of the Van Gogh Museum, which identifies it as Self-
Portrait with a Felt Hat. Van Gogh Museum, http://www3.vangoghmuseum.nl/vgm/index.jsp?page= 
1957&collection=1285&lang=en (last visited July 19, 2008). 
 
271
 Van Gogh Wrecker Sentenced to Jail, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 28, 1979, at 15 (reporting 
on vandalism to the painting); Van Gogh Museum, http://www3.vangoghmuseum.nl/vgm/index.jsp 
?page=1303&lang=en (last visited July 19, 2008) (providing the year for the painting). 
 
272
 Student Slashes Portrait of Princess of Wales, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1981, at 5. 
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1982 Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue? IV (1969-
70), Barnett Newman; New National Gallery, 
Berlin, Germany; damaged by physical assault and 
with strikes from a plastic bar.273 
1983 17th-century painting; Ducal Palace, Venice, Italy; 
damaged from knife slashes and torn by hand.274 
Number 17 C (1947), Multiform (1949), Number 8, 
(1949), and two untitled paintings (1949), Mark 
Rothko; San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, San 
Francisco, California, United States; damaged by 
scratches.275 
1984 Rosa Zeiten (1978), Salomé and Wirtschaftswerte 
(1980), Josef Beuys; Düsseldorf, Germany; 
damaged with spray paint.276 
 Saint Peter (late 14th-early 15th c.) and The Virgin 
Enthroned Among the Saints (late 14th-early 15th 
c.), Taddeo di Bartolo, six additional unidentified 
15th-17th-century paintings; National Gallery, 
Umbria, Italy; damaged by scratches and with 
pierced holes.277  
 Le Jardin (1936), Pierre Bonnard; Dallas Museum 
of Art, Dallas, Texas, United States; damaged by 
twelve-inch gash.278 
 Judson Smith (1926), Andrew Dasburg; Dallas 
Museum of Art, Dallas, Texas, United States; 
damaged with pierced holes.279  
  
 
273
 GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 207; Dornberg, supra note 33, at 103. 
 
274
 Tourist Rips Painting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1983, at C25; Artner, supra note 9; 
Iconoclasts, Art Vandalism is an Expression, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2007, at C15. 
 
275
 Rothko Paintings Vandalized, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1983, at 14. 
 
276
 MARK ROSENTHAL, JOSEPH BEUYS: ACTIONS, VITRINES, ENVIRONMENTS 82 (2004) 
(providing year of Beuys’ installation); Dornberg, supra note 33, at 102; E-mail from Salomé W. 
Cihlarz, the artist, to author (July 20, 2008, 03:25 am EST) (on file with author) (providing original 
title and year for Rosa Zeiten and reporting on vandalism to Josef Beuys’ installation). 
 
277
 SIBILLA SYMEONIDES, TADDEO DI BARTOLO 31, 85, 129 (1965) (providing period of 
artist’s activity); Italian Paintings Damaged in Gallery, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 4, 1984, at M7 
(reporting on vandalism to paintings). 
 
278
 Bonnard Is Damaged At Dallas Art Museum, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1984, at C24; 
Painting Damaged in Dallas Museum, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 26, 1984, at E11. 
 
279
 Id. (reporting on vandalism to painting); VAN DEREN COKE, ANDREW DASBURG 46 
(1979) (providing year of painting). 
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1985 Danaë (1636), Rembrandt van Rijn; State 
Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia; 
damaged from knife slashes and with sulfuric 
acid.280 
King Philip IV of Spain (1628), Peter Paul Rubens; 
Kunsthaus Museum, Zurich, Switzerland; destroyed 
by arson.281 
1986 Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue III (1967-8), 
Barnett Newman; Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, 
Holland; damaged from knife slashes.282 
1987 The Virgin and Child with St. Anne and the Infant 
St. John (1500), Leonardo da Vinci; National 
Gallery, London, England; damaged from splintered 
glass following gun shot.283 
1988 Eleven 19th-century American paintings (A Portrait 
of George Clinton, Ezra Ames; The Bear Dance, 
William Holbrook Beard; Pilgrims Going to 
Church, George Henry Boughton; Pocahontas 
Saving the Life of Captain John Smith, John Gadsby 
Chapman; Interior of George Haywood’s Porter 
House, New York City, Edmund D. Hawthorne; 
Bowling Green, New York City, David Johnson; 
Santa Claus, Robert Walter Weir; Sailing on Great 
South Bay, Junius Brutus Stearns; The Parting 
Guests, Woodworth Thompson; John S. Kennedy, 
Seymour J. Guy; Alfred van Santvoord, Eastman 
Johnson); New York Historical Society, New York, 
New York, United States; damaged from slashes 
with sharp instrument.284 
Mary as Grieving Mother (1496), Paumgartner 
Altar (16th century), Mourning of Christ (1504), 
Albrecht Dürer; Alte Pinakothek Museum, Munich, 
Germany; damaged with sulfuric acid.285 
  
 
280
 Talley, Rembrandt, supra note 79, at 86. 
 
281
 Rubens Work is Burned, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1985, at C27. 
 
282
 GAMBONI, supra note 9, at 211; Vogel, supra note 71, at E1. 
 
283
 Mental Tests Suspect in Marring of Leonardo, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1987, at C17; 
Brandon Taylor, Picking Up the Pieces, ARTNEWS, Feb. 1989, at 43. 
 
284
 Eleven Paintings Are Slashed at New-York Society, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1988, at C16. 
 
285
 Three Durer Masterpieces Vandalized with Acid, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1988, at C28. 
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1989 Ten 17th-century Dutch paintings (The 
Eavesdropper (1657), Portrait of Jacob de Wit 
(1657), Children in a Landscape (1674), Self-
Portrait (c. 1685), Nicolaes Maes; Couple in a 
Landscape (c. 1648), Venus, Paris, and Amor 
(1656), Ferdinand Bols; St. Anna Praying (1643), 
Jan Victor; Portrait of Adriaen Braets (1664) and 
Portrait of Maria van de Braeff (1664), Jacobus 
Leveck; Conversion of St. Paul (c. 1650), Albert 
Cuyp); Dordrechts Museum, Dordrechts, Holland; 
damaged from knife slashes.286 
 Network of Stoppages (1914), Marcel Duchamp; 
Museum of Modern Art, New York, New York, 
United States; damaged from a six-inch gash with a 
sharp instrument.287 
1990 La Madonna Del Gatto, Federico Baroccio (before 
1577); National Gallery, London, England; 
damaged from nine knife slashes.288 
 The Night Watch (1642), Rembrandt van Rijn; 
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, Holland; damaged with 
chemical solution.289 
 Six paintings (including Still Life with Brioche 
(1880), Edouard Manet; Road at Wargmonte 
(1879), Pierre-Auguste Renoir; Self Portrait (1865-
66), Frederic Bazille); Nelson-Atkins Museum, 
Kansas City, Missouri, United States; damaged with 
sharp object.290 
  
 
286
 Talley, Dutch Disaster, supra note 8, at 60-61. 
 
287
 Painting Slashed at Modern, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1990, at C13. 
 
288
 Man Slashes 16th-Century Art, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 11, 1990, at A13; Art Vandalism 
Trial, TIMES, Feb. 9, 1990. 
 
289
 Museum Visitor Damages a Rembrandt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1990, at 13 (reporting on 
the vandalism of the painting); Rijksmuseum, http://www.rijksmuseum.nl/aria/aria_assets/SK-C-
5?lang=en (last visited July 19, 2008) (providing year for the painting). 
 
290
 MARC S. GERSTEIN, IMPRESSIONISM: SELECTIONS FROM FIVE AMERICAN MUSEUMS, 
166-67 (1989) (providing correct artist and year for Road at Wargmonte); Six Paintings in Exhibit 
Are Damaged, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1990, at C4 (reporting on vandalism); Art Institute of Chicago, 
http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/110661 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (providing the year 
for Self Portrait); Carnegie Museum of Art, http://www.cmoa.org/searchcollections/details.aspx?item 
=1025372 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (providing the year for Still Life with Brioche). 
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1991 David (1501-04), Michelangelo Buonarrati; Galleria 
dell’Accademia Museum, Florence, Italy; damaged 
with hammer.291 
1993 Thirty-three paintings (including the destroyed 
Birth of Christ, Gerrit van Honthorst; 
Buonadventura and Ciclo Viti, Barolommeo 
Manfredi) and three sculptures; Uffizi Gallery, 
Florence, Italy; three paintings destroyed and thirty 
paintings and three sculptures damaged from bomb 
explosion.292 
 Curtains (1962), Roy Lichtenstein; Whitney 
Museum of American Art, New York, New York, 
United States; damaged with ink.293 
1994 Away from the Flock (1994), Damien Hirst; 
Serpentine Gallery, London, England; damaged 
with ink.294 
1996 The Harbor at Le Havre (1905-06), Raoul Dufy; 
Art Gallery of Ontario, Ontario, Canada; defaced 
with vomit.295 
 Composition in White, Black and Red (1936), Piet 
Mondrian; Museum of Modern Art, New York, 
New York, United States; defaced with vomit.296 
1997 White Cross on Gray (Suprematisme) (1920-27), 
Kazimir Malevich; Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, 
Holland; damaged with spray paint.297 
Cathedra (1951), Barnett Newman; Stedelijk 
Museum, Amsterdam, Holland; damaged from 
seven knife slashes.298 
1998 Two busts of Christopher Columbus and Amerigo 
Vespucci (c. 1815), Giuseppe Ceracchi; White 
  
 
291
 Alan Cowell, Michelangelo’s David is Damaged, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at 3. 
 
292
 Hughes, supra note 101, at 34; Muchnic, supra note 79, at 6F. 
 
293
 Vogel, supra note 4, at C23. 
 
294
 Kastner, supra note 7, at 154.  
 
295
 Id. at 155; DePalma, supra note 5. 
 
296
 Id. 
 
297
 John O’Mahony, Restoration and Devastation: John O’Mahony on the 1998 Cultural 
Scene in Eastern Europe, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 6, 1998, at 13; Art Crime, 
http://www.artcrimes.net/pages/malevich.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). 
 
298
 Vogel, supra note 71, at E1. 
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House, Washington, District of Columbia, United 
States; defaced with spray paint.299 
 The Icebergs (1861), Frederic Church; Lighthouse 
Hill (1927), Edward Hopper; Dallas Art Museum, 
Dallas, Texas, United States; damaged from lengthy 
scratches with sharp instrument.300 
Zora Standing (1912), Pianist and Checkers 
Players (1924), The Oriental (L’Asiatique) (1939), 
Henri Matisse; Capitoline Art Museum, Rome, 
Italy; damaged with ink.301 
Self Portrait at the Age of 63 (1669), Rembrandt 
van Rijn, National Gallery, London, England; 
defaced with paint.302 
1999 Sentieri Ondulanti (Watery Paths) (1947), Jackson 
Pollack; National Gallery of Modern Art, Rome, 
Italy; defaced with ink.303 
Nude in Front of the Garden (1956), Pablo Picasso; 
Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, Holland; damaged 
from large hole with blunt knife.304 
 The Holy Virgin Mary (1996), Chris Ofili; Brooklyn 
Museum of Art, Brooklyn, New York, United 
States; defaced with paint.305 
  
 
299
 Maria Elena Fernandez, Tourist at White House Defaces Two Sculptures with Spray 
Paint, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1998, at B1. 
 
300
 Three Paintings Vandalized at Dallas Museum of Art, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1998, 
at C2 (reporting on vandalism); Dallas Museum of Art, http://dallasmuseumofart.org/Dallas_Museum_ 
of_Art/View/Collections/American/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (providing the years for the 
two paintings). 
 
301
 Nick Allen, Hermitage Art Vandalized in Rome, MOSCOW TIMES, Feb. 6, 1998; 
National Gallery of Art, http://www.nga.gov/cgi-bin/pinfo?Object=65246+0+none (last visited Nov. 
14, 2008) (providing the year and more commonly-used title for Pianist and Checkers Players); id., 
http://www.nga.gov/fcgi-bin/tinfo_f?object=72329 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (providing the year 
and more commonly-used title for The Oriental (L’Asiatique)); see also Alessandra Stanley, Art 
Thieves in Rome Take 2 Van Goghs and a Cezanne, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1998, at A3.  
 
302
 Jason Bennetto, Man Squirts Yellow Paint on National Gallery Rembrandt, INDEP. 
(London), Aug. 6, 1998, at 5 (reporting on the defacement of the painting); Nat’l Gallery, 
http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/cgi-bin/WebObjects.dll/CollectionPublisher.woa/wa/work?work 
Number=NG221 (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) (providing the year for the painting). 
 
303
 Italian Art Vandal Strikes Again, This Time It’s a Pollock Painting, GLOBE & MAIL 
(CANADA), Jan. 27, 1999, at C5. 
 
304
 Marlise Simons, A Picasso is Severely Slashed By a Dutch Mental Patient, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 1999, at E1. 
 
305
 Robert D. McFadden, Disputed Madonna Painting in Brooklyn Show Is Defaced, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1999, at A1. Art Crimes, http://www.artcrimes.net/holy-virgin-mary (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2009) (providing image of and year for the painting).  
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2001 Two paintings (including Rocky Landscape (c. 
1783), Thomas Gainsborough); Brooks Museum of 
Art, Memphis, Tennessee, United States; damaged 
from three-centimeter scrape.306 
2002 Marble Lady (2002), Neil Simmons; Guildhall Art 
Gallery, London, England; damaged from strikes 
with a cricket bat and metal pole.307 
2003 Washington Crossing the Delaware (1851), 
Emanuel Gottlieb Leutze; Metropolitan Museum of 
Art, New York, New York, United States; defaced 
with photograph adhered with glue.308 
 Insult to Injury (2003), Jake and Dinos Chapman; 
Modern Art Oxford, Oxford, England; damaged 
with paint.309 
2005-2007 Thirty-five attacks (not itemized); Smithsonian 
museums, Washington, District of Columbia, 
United States.310 
2005 Nude in Mirror (1994), Roy Lichtenstein; 
Kunsthaus Bregenz, Vienna, Austria; damaged from 
four twelve-inch knife slashes.311 
2006 Fountain (1917), Marcel Duchamp; Centre 
Pompidou, Paris, France; damaged with hammer.312  
Durga (1964) and Draupadi (c. 1960-70s), 
Maqbool Fida Husain; Asia House, London, 
England; damaged with spray paint.313 
  
 
306
 SCOTTISH TREASURES: MASTERPIECES FROM THE NATIONAL GALLERY OF SCOTLAND 
100 (2001) (providing year for the Gainsborough painting); Frank O’Donnell, On-Loan Masterpiece 
Hit by Vandals, SCOTSMAN, Apr. 9, 2001, at 5.  
 
307
 Gysin, supra note 73, at 20. 
 
308
 Kerry Burke & Alice McQuillan, Bizarre 9/11 Twist to Vandal’s Deed, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Jan. 24, 2003, at 5. 
 
309
 “Comedy Terrorist” Barschak Jailed for Paint Attack, HERALD (Glasgow), Nov. 25, 
2003, at 8; William Underhill, Going Over Goya, ARTNEWS, June 2003, at 50 (providing year of 
artists’ work). 
 
310
 James V. Grimaldi, GAO Faults Smithsonian Upkeep and Security; Leaks and 
Vandalism Threaten Collections, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2007, at A-1; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1127, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION: FUNDING CHALLENGES 
AFFECT FACILITIES’ CONDITION AND SECURITY, ENDANGERING COLLECTIONS 33 (2007), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071127.pdf.  
 
311
 MARY LEE CORLETT, THE PRINTS OF ROY LICHTENSTEIN: A CATALOGUE RAISONNÉ 
1948-1997 263 (2002) (providing year of Nude series); Museum Visitor Cuts Lichtenstein Painting, 
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 2005, at 14. 
 
312
 Riding, supra note 75.  
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Celebration of Peace at Münster (1648), 
Bartholomeus vand der Helst; Reischmuseum, 
Amsterdam, Holland; damaged with sulfuric acid.314 
2007 The Triumph of David (1640), Ottavio Vannini; 
Milwaukee Museum of Art, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
United States; damaged from large hole from 
physical assault.315 
  Phaedrus (1977), Cy Twombly; Collection 
Lambert, Museum of Contemporary Art, Avignon, 
France; damaged from lipstick stain.316 
Samuel Johnson (c. 1772-78), Sir Joshua Reynolds; 
National Gallery of Art, London, England; damaged 
from shredding from hammer strikes to protective 
glass.317 
 Seven photographs from A History of Sex (1997), 
Andres Serrano; Kulturen Gallery, Lund, Sweden; 
destroyed with crowbars and axes.318 
Le Pont D’Argenteuil (1874), Claude Monet; Musée 
D’Orsay, Paris, France; damaged from four-inch 
hole from physical assault.319 
  
 
313
 Amit Roy, Vandals Close Exhibition, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), May 29, 2006, at 
8; Ajay Prakash, London Gallery Closes M.F. Husain Exhibition After Paintings Are Vandalised, 
World Socialist Web Site, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jul2006/husa-j03.shtml (last visited 
July 19, 2008) (identifying the titles of the vandalized paintings); see also Press Release, Asia 
House, First Solo Exhibition in London: M.F. Husain: Early Masterpieces 1950s-70s (May 2006), 
http://www.asiahouse.org/net/documents/ah10027.pdf (last visited July 19, 2008) (providing the year 
for Durga).  
 
314
 Mittelacher, supra note 2, at S13. 
 
315
 Ill Man Damages Museum Painting, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Apr. 5, 2007, 
at A10. 
 
316
 Kiss Is Just a Kiss, Not a Cy, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 10, 2007, at C10 (reporting on the 
vandalism to the painting); Susan Bell, One is Art, One is Vandalism—But Which is Which?, 
SCOTSMAN , Oct. 10, 2007, http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=1617642007 (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2007) (providing image of the lipstick-stained painting); see also Press Release, Collection 
Lambert, I Don’t Kiss, http://www.collectionlambert.net/jembrassepas/presse/Press_release.pdf (last 
visited July 19, 2008) (providing the year of the painting and discussing the exhibition J’embrasse 
Pas, which was organized in response to the vandalism of Twombly’s work).  
 
317
 Lee Glendinning, Vandal Admits Hammer Attack on Portrait Worth £1.7m, 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 2007, at 10. 
 
318
 Vogel, supra note 103, at E1. 
 
319
 James Kanter, Vandal Punches Hole in a Monet in Paris, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, at 
A8. 
